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Bar Associations: Policies and Performances
Quintin Johnstonet
Bar associations are an integral part of the legal profession and, along with
law firms, courts, legislatures, and law schools, essential features of the
modem American legal system. Despite their prominent place in the legal field,
however, bar associations have received surprisingly meager scholarly
attention.! This Article seeks to help remedy this oversight by examining the
contribution of bar associations to the legal system at large. In particular, it
identifies the principal policies pursued by the associations and evaluates how
effectively they further these policies. In addition, the Article addresses some
of the bar associations' major limitations and makes recommendations for their
improvement.
There are substantial variations among bar associations, but two principal
types stand out: comprehensive associations and specialty associations. This
Article concentrates on the major comprehensive organizations, which include
the American Bar Association (ABA), each of the state bar associations,2 and
the largest of the local bar associations. 3 Both the specialty associations and
t Professor of Law, New York Law School; Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale
Law School.
I. For two excellent recent studies of important local bar associations, see TERENCE C. HALLIDAY,
BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT (1987)
(concentrating on Chicago Bar Association) and MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988). See
also 3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY 130-33 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988-1989)
(comparing bar associations in many common law and civil law countries, including United States).
2. In its statistical classifications, the ABA includes as state bar associations the two bar associations
in the District of Columbia (one of which is mandatory), the Puerto Rico Bar Association, and the
Virgin Islands Bar Association. See ABA DIY. FOR BAR SERYS., 1995 BAR ACTIVITIES INvENTORY § 2
(Joanne O'Reilly ed., 1995) [hereinafter ABA INVENTORY]. North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia
each have two state bar associations, membership in one being mandatory to practice in the state. See
id.
3. According to the ABA, there are 24 of these associations with 3500 or more members. They are
(with the size of their memberships as of 1995 in parentheses) as follows: the Los Angeles County Bar
Association (22,786); the Chicago Bar Association (21,665); the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (20,100); the Philadelphia Bar Association (12,500); the New York County Lawyers
Association (10,200); the Houston Bar Association (9537); the Bar Association ofSan Francisco (9000);
the Dallas Bar Association (7400); the Denver Bar Association (7257); the Allegheny County Bar
Association (pennsylvania) (7175); the Boston Bar Association (7086); the San Diego Bar Association
(7004); the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis (6100); the Orange County Bar Association
(California) (6000); the Atlanta Bar Association (5500); the Cleveland Bar Association (5196); the King
County Bar Association (Washington) (4385); the Columbus Bar Association (Ohio) (4300); the
Maricopa County Bar Association (Arizona) (4100); the Dade County Bar Association (Florida) (3951);
the Cincinnati Bar Association (3593); the Santa Clara County Bar Association (California) (3704); the
Mulmomah Bar Association (Oregon) (3503); and the Kansas City Metropolitan Bar Association (3500).
See id.
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the comprehensive associations are structured geographically, with membership
drawn from a national pool or from a particular state or local area. 4 But in
terms of membership, financial resources, and range of activities, the
comprehensive organizations are significantly more influential than the
specialty organizations. Whereas specialty associations focus on a particular
type of practices or a particular group of lawyers,6 the comprehensive bar
associations contain a broad cross-section of lawyers and are concerned with
these lawyers' varied interests. 7
Many of the existing major comprehensive bar associations were organized
over a hundred years ago. The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, for example, was founded in 1870, the Chicago Bar Association in 1874,
and the ABA in 1878.8 Among the first state bar associations were the Iowa
State Bar Association, organized in 1874, and the New York State Bar
Association, organized in 1876.9 The memberships of the earliest comprehen-
4. Not surprisingly, most associations' interests are centered heavily on the geographical area from
which they draw their members. In addition to the national, state and local organizations, there are a
few regional bar associations, like the New England Bar Association, and a few international
associations, like the Inter-American Bar Association (with headquarters in Washington, D.C.) and the
International Bar Association (with headquarters in London, England).
5. For example, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers; the American Immigration
Lawyers Association; the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. The Association of Trial Lawyers
of America, with over 60,000 members, is the largest specialty bar association in the country. See 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 738 (Sandra Jaszczat ed., 1996).
6. For example, the National Association of Women Lawyers; the Hispanic National Bar
Association; the National Bar Association. On the history and activities of the National Bar Association,
an African-American organization with over 16,000 members, see Gloria Wilson Shelton, NatiofUJl Bar
Association: Championsjor Justice, 38 MD. B.J. 10 (1995). On minority bar associations generally, see
Karol Corbin Walker, Serving a Purpose Then and Now: The Continuing Role oj Minority Bar
Associations, N.J. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 36. In addition to these organizations, some specialty
associations cater to lawyers from a particular employment setting. See. e.g., the American Corporate
Counsels Association; the National District Attorneys Association; the National Association ofAttorneys
General; the National Association of Bar Executives.
7. Comprehensive bar association memberships include lawyers from general practice as well as
different kinds of specialty practices, from different sizes and types of law offices, and with different
kinds of client bases (rich and poor, private and public, corporations and individuals). There are usually
a number of nonpracticing members, including some judges, full-time law professors, retired lawyers,
and corporate and government officials.
In addition, many comprehensive bar associations have a separate membership category for law
students and nonlawyer employees of law offices (such as paralegals and legal administrators). There
are, in fact, independent national associations of nonlawyer specialists working in law offices, including
two paralegal organizations (the National Association of Legal Assistants and the National Federation
of Paralegal Associations) and an association of law office administrators (the Association of Legal
Administrators). See generally John J. Michalik, Legal Administrators, 36 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGMT.
306 (1995) (discussing Association of Legal Administrators).
8. On the history of American bar associations, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 285-94 (1950) and M. LOUISE RUTHERFORD, THE INFLUENCE OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON PuBLIC OPINION AND LEGISLATION 7-34 (1937). Among the
histories of individual bar associations are GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AssocIATION OF THE BAR Of THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970
(1970) and EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION AND ITS WORK
(1953).
9. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 259 (1953).
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sive bar associations were largely restricted to the more respected members of
the bar. In addition to providing social opportunities for lawyers with common
interests, the early associations were concerned with such matters as eliminat-
ing unprofessional behavior by lawyers, cleaning up corruption in local
government, imposing higher pre-admission educational standards on lawyers,
and occasionally pushing legal reform. 10
As the memberships of the major comprehensive bar associations have
grown and become more diverse,11 the range of association programs has
expanded. In addition, organizational structures of the associations have
become more complex, budgets have become larger, and more administrative
work has been turned over to full-time employees. These forms of expansion
have increased the opportunities as well as the problems of the associations.
Although there are sharp differences among them in policy priorities and
implementation, the major comprehensive bar associations today are remark-
ably similar in the policies they seek to advance. As their activities and
declarations of purpose reveal,12 the associations aim to benefit three principal
target groups: individual lawyers, the legal profession generally, and the public
at large. In general, the associations aim to benefit individual lawyers by
providing them with opportunities to improve their professional skill and
knowledge, to develop useful professional contacts, to expand their client base,
and to increase their income. They aim to benefit the legal profession generally
by helping to maintain a competent, respected, and ethically responsible body
of lawyers and by protecting the profession from unqualified legal service
competition. They aim to benefit the general public by protecting and
strengthening the administration of justice, by enhancing public understanding
of and respect for law and legal institutions, and by identifying and advocating
10. On the early concerns and activities of comprehensive bar associations, see HALLIDAY, supra
note I, at 63-73; POWELL, supra note I, at 6-11; Norbert Brockman, The Politics of the American Bar
Association (1963) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America) (on fIle with the
Yale Law School Library).
11. Bar associations have grown in size along with the number of lawyers in the United States. The
number of lawyers in America doubled between 1900 and 1960, and then tripled between 1960 and
1990. See Robert L. Nelson, The Future ofAmerican Lawyers: A Demographic Profile ofa Changing
Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 345, 390 (1994). As of 1991, there were
805,872 lawyers in the United States, though this figure included retired lawyers and lawyers working
outside the profession. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED
STATES 212 (1995).
12. The ABA's statement of purposes, for example, reads:
The purposes of the Association are to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States
and maintain representative government; to advance the science ofjurisprudence; to promote
throughout the nation the administration of justice and the uniformity of legislation and of
judicial decisions; to uphold the honor of the profession of law; to apply the knowledge and
experience of the profession to the promotion of the public good; to encourage cordial
intercourse among the members of the American bar; and to correlate and promote the
activities of the bar organizations in the nation within these purposes and in the interests of
the profession and of the public.
ABA CONST. § 1.2.
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needed changes in the law and opposing those they consider undesirable.
The major comprehensive bar associations play a significant role in
representing an influential profession. This Article is an attempt to assess that
role and to identify the major limitations preventing associations from being
even more effective. Part I considers the resources available to bar associations
and stresses that the associations'members are their most important resource.
Part II focuses on the organizational structures of bar associations and notes
their weaknesses. Part III examines the various programs that bar associations
conduct, and their mixed record of effectiveness. Part IV discusses more
generally the limitations to greater bar association effectiveness. And finally,
Parts V and VI present some recommendations for improving the organizations
and some conclusions about their future.
I. RESOURCES
Like organizations of all kinds, bar associations depend on, and are limited
by, the resources available to them. The principal resource of bar associations
is their members. In addition to providing most of the funding and leadership
of the organizations, members do most of the work. In contrast to many trade
associations, bar associations are composed of individual members, not firms.
The ABA is by far the largest bar association in the United States, with a
lawyer membership of 339,000 from throughout the nation,13 or about forty
percent of the nation's lawyers. The largest of the state bar associations is the
California Bar Association, with almost 115,000 members. 14 Of the hundreds
of comprehensive local bar associations in the United States,15 the twenty-four
largest have over 3500 members each; the three largest-the Los Angeles
County Bar Association, the Chicago Bar Association, and the Association of
13. See Robert A. Stein, Executive Director's Report, Mission: Membership, A.B.A. 1., Aug.
1996, at 116 (hereinafter Stein, Mission: Membership]. This figure is down from 362,000 in 1993,
though the ABA is apparently still the largest professional association in the world. See Robert A. Stein,
Executive Director's Report, Plenty to Be Proud About, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 92 (hereinafter Stein,
Plenty to Be Proud About]. The ABA considers its membership decline the number one issue with which
it is faced. See Stein, Mission: Membership, supra; if. Darryl Van Ouch, Associations Face Declining
Member Rolls, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at Al (discussing risks of membership decline facing other
comprehensive bar associations). In addition to its regular membership, the ABA has 42,000 student and
associate members. See Stein, Mission: Membership, supra.
14. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, § 2. The next largest state bar associations in terms of
membership are the District of Columbia Bar Association (64,000 members); the State Bar of Texas
(62,500); and the New York State Bar Association (55,500). See id. The smallest state bar associations
are the Virgin Islands Bar Association (570 members); the West Virginia Bar Association (1271); and
the Bar Association of North Dakota (1700). See id. About one third of the state bar associations have
associate or affIliate paralegal members. See Steven Cohn, Welcome to the Club, LEGAL AssISfANT
TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 54.
15. There are at least 150 local bar associations with over 300 members each, see ABA
INVENTORY, supra note 2, § I, though there are presumably more since this figure excludes associations
that failed to respond to the ABA questionnaire. See id. at 1. In addition, there are many county and
city bar associations with fewer than 300 members.
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the Bar of the City of New York-have over 20,000 members each. 16
Thirty-five of the fifty-seven state bar associationsl7 are unified, meaning
that a statute or court rule requires membership in the association for a lawyer
to practice in the state. 18 Since they are mandatory, unified associations are
generally more regulated than other associations. In non-unified bar associa-
tions, membership is voluntary, although a number of these associations limit
membership to those in a particular jurisdiction or type of practice.
Bar association members in leadership positions are unpaid,19 and almost
all maintain full-time jobs in law offices or other legal service agencies while
attending to their association responsibilities. Leaders not only donate their
time and effort to association affairs, but their firms commonly donate staff
time to assist with association administrative duties. Beyond their leadership,
all major comprehensive bar associations have paid staff members. The ABA
and the California State Bar each have a total of around eight hundred
employees,20 while the largest local association-the Los Angeles County Bar
Association-has ninety-five employees.21 Some of the smaller state bar
associations have as few as ten paid staff members each.22
The associations' staffs have become increasingly essential resources as
association activities have increased. They now perform much of the routine
administrative work of the associations, while top staff employees frequently
exert some policy influence on association affairs (for instance by giving
guidance to newly elected or appointed leaders). Although subordinate to the
member leadership, the executive director is a full-time association employee
with substantial influence on association affairs. Other employees common to
larger associations, such as lobbyists, staff attorneys, and the director of
continuing legal education (CLE), also exert substantial influence.
Most bar association income comes from annual member dues, so the
16. See supra note 3.
17. See supra, note 2.
18. Bar associations in the following jurisdictions are unified: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan.
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico. North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virgin Islands,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Utah. See ABA INVENTORY, supra
note 2, § 2; see also Larry J. Rector, Compelled Financial Support of a Bar Association and the
Attorney's First Amendment Rights: A Theoretical Analysis, 66 NEB. L. REv. 762, 763, 00.5-7 (1987)
(listing when bar associations became unified and whether requirement was imposed by statute, court
rule, or combination of two). For illustrative examples of the legal requirements for unified bar
associations, see ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 31 (1996), CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6052 (West 1996),
and WIS. SUP. CT. R. chs. 10, 11 (1996).
19. The ABA is an exception to this rule, paying annual stipends to its President ($100,000) and
President-Elect ($50,000). There is an assumption that these are essentially full-time jobs. See James
Podgers, Presidential Aid, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994. at 101.
20. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, § 2; Van Duch, supra note 13.
21. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, § 2.
22. The State Bar of South Dakota, for example, has only four paid staff members while the
Vermont Bar Association has six. See id.
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number of members and the rate of dues are crucial resource considerations.23
Additional sources of income include publication sales and advertising, CLE
fees, section membership fees, gifts, foundation grants, and insurance programs
that an association may provide or sponsor.24 The ABA, with its large
membership and considerable ingenuity in attracting funds from other sources,
has by far the highest annual income of any bar association, currently totaling
137 million dollars. 25 Among state bar organizations, the California Bar
Association leads in annual income, with ninety-five million dollars,26 while
the Los Angeles County Bar Association has the highest income of local bar
associations, at 9.5 million dollars.27 Meanwhile, some of the smaller state
bar associations have annual incomes of under one million dollars each.28
Annual dues for members vary considerably among associations.29 For
example, annual dues are $190 for most active members of the Florida Bar,30
$275 for ABA members who have been members of the bar for ten or more
years,3l and $478 for most California State Bar members. 32 Member resis-
tance has made the associations hesitant to increase dues; in fact, in some
instances, associations have been forced to reduce dues, 33
In addition to membership resources, another valuable asset of major
comprehensive bar associations is their reputation in important circles, both
public and private. Well-known and highly regarded members help further
association policies through their contacts, and they often support their
proposals with carefully prepared position papers or draft legislation. Their
23. Aside from the benefits of exposure and continuing legal education, bar associations offer their
members a number of benefits in exchange for their dues. In addition to the programs mentioned infra
in Part Ill, the associations sometimes offer reduced rates on items like insurance coverage, office
supplies, and auto rentals. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, §§ 3-VI, 4-VI; TEN SMART WAYS TO
MAXIMIZE YOUR ABA MEMBERSHIP (1996) (pamphlet) (publicizing advantages of ABA membership);
THE PROFESSIONAL ADVANTAGE (pamphlet) (publicizing advantages of New York State Bar
membership), included in N.Y. ST. B.I., Sept.-oct. 1995, at 32.
24. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, §§ 3-XVIll, 4-XVill (providing statistical data on sources
of bar association income other than dues).
25. See M. Peter Moses, American Bar Association Treasurer's Report, A.B.A. I., Ian. 1996, at
97.
26. Dues constitute 77% of the California Bar Association's income. See Budget: Courage or Folly,
CAL. ST. B.I., Ian. 1996, at 8.
27. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, § 2.
28. See id.
29. Associations charge lower dues to some members, such as inactive members of the bar, lawyers
recently admitted to practice, and student and associate members. See id. §§ 3-V, 4-V.
30. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 1.7.3(a) (Harrison 1993).
31. See ABA POUCY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK, 1995-1996, at 53 (1995) [hereinafter ABA
HANDBOOK].
32. See Towery Wolts Toward Dues Decrease, CAL. ST. B.I., Dec. 1995, at 5 (reporting bar
president's goal to reduce 1997 dues and noting higher cost of medical society fees in California). One
reason for the fact that the California State Bar's dues are relatively high is that the association pays a
majority of the cost associated with the state's unique and expensive disciplinary system. For more on
this system, see infra note 104.
33. See lames Towery, Bar's Chief Welcomes Member Vote, CAL. ST. B.I., Nov. 1995, at 5
(discussing leadership sensitivity to bar association dues).
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reputations have helped the associations develop cooperative ties with other
legal organizations and have facilitated relations with courts and government
agencies. The associations' reputations usually assure a serious hearing when
association representatives make statutory or other law-reform proposalS.34 It
helps, of course, that many of those whom the associations seek to influence
are lawyers and association members.
In comparison to large business corporations and many government
agencies, the major comprehensive bar associations' financial resources are
limited. As with many other nonprofit organizations, therefore, bar associations
must rely heavily on nonfinancial resources, especially volunteer services, to
achieve their goals. Fortunately for the bar associations, their members are
from a skilled profession, so those who volunteer their services are generally
highly skilled.
II. ORGANIZATION
In addition to sufficient resources, bar associations need proper organization
to carry on their activities most effectively. Poor organization results not only
in waste and inefficiency but also increases the possibility of disruptive internal
dissension. This Part examines the organizational structure common to most
comprehensive bar associations. This structure, it is argued, significantly limits
organizational effectiveness as it is conducive to weak leadership at the top and
undue risk of inept performance below.
The major comprehensive bar associations typically follow a common
organizational pattern, including membership-controlled governance, part-time
unpaid members in leadership positions, and decentralized control over
operations.35 The full membership elects officers and a legislative body to
head the association, and occasionally elects an executive board as well. 36
Significant control over association affairs, however, lies in semiautonomous
subgroups of association members called sections and committeesY These
subgroups have their own officers, and usually operate free from interference
by the top leadership of the associations. The leadership usually does, however,
34. A bar association's lack of influence with important figures and groups may hamper some of
its reform efforts. For example. in the past. the lack of influence with local political figures and nonelite
bar groups by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York obstructed the adoption of some
important reforms. See POWELL. supra note I, at 193-211.
35. In its basic outline. the governance structure of the ABA resembles the usual bar association
format: officers, a house of delegates. a board of governors. and sections, committees. and other
member subunits. See generally ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 1-52. For a typical state bar
association's governance structure. see CONN. B. Ass'N CONST. arts. v-vm.
36. The executive board has authority to act for the legislative body on many matters when the
latter is not in session.
37. Some associations do not have member subgroups caned sections but have committees that take
over section functions. In addition to sections and committees, many associations have additional
member subunits, such as task forces, boards, divisions, and commissions.
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have the power to appoint section officers, Sections have their own meetings,
frequently have their own publications, and often initiate their own law reform
proposals,
Most sections concentrate on one specialty field of law practice, such as
criminal law, taxation, or litigation, and members of these sections are often
specialists in their field, Other sections, however, focus on different issues, for
instance the concerns of young lawyers, 38 senior lawyers,39 minority law-
yers,4O or women lawyers;41 or the special concerns of solo and small firm
practitioners,42 government lawyers,43 or lawyers employed by corporate law
departments. 44 In addition, there are sections on different aspects of profes-
sional practice such as law office management,4S alternative dispute resolu-
tion,46 and legal education and admission to the bar.47
The principal purpose of most sections is to provide a forum in which
association members with a special interest in a particular field of law may
further their knowledge, develop contacts, and influence changes in the law,
Sections are usually open to any association member upon payment of a
separate section membership fee. Some of the larger associations have sections
with more than one thousand members,48 and many bar associations have
38. Most bar associations make a special effon to attract young members. For example, the
Chicago Bar Association's Young Members Section offers a variety of programs for its 11,000
members, including educational and career service seminars, athletic programs, social events, and a
series of programs providing legal and nonlegal assistance to disadvantaged children in the Chicago area.
See Elizabeth E. Lewis, Thoughts From the Chair, CBA REc. (Chicago Bar Association), Jun.-JuI.
1995, at 46; Linda M. Rio, Thoughts From the Chair, CBA REc. (Chicago Bar Association), May 1995,
at 40; if Jeffrey M. Paskert, As Always Public Service is Primary Mission ofDivision, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 5, 1996, at C21 (discussing activities of ABA's Young Lawyers Division).
39. For example, the Connecticut Bar Association's Senior Lawyers Section; the ABA's Senior
Lawyers Division.
40. For example, the Texas Bar Association's Committee on Opportunities for Minorities in the
Profession.
41. For example, the California State Bar's Women in the Law Committee. On the activities of this
committee, see Karen L. Bizzini, The State Bar Committee on Women in the Law, L.A. LAW., Apr.
1995, at 13.
42. For example, the ABA's General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section; the ABA's Standing
Committee on the Solo and Small Firm Practitioner. On the efforts of these bodies, see Roben A. Stein,
A Solo and Small Firm Majority, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 105. For similar efforts by a local bar
association, see Douglas M. Case, The Solo and Small Firm Practitioners Committee, CBA REp.
(Cincinnati Bar Association), June 1995, at 8.
43. For example, the Hawaii State Bar Association's Government Lawyers' Section. On this
section, see Government Lawyers' Section Annual Repon, HAW. BJ., Feb. 1995, at 30.
44. For example, the Connecticut Bar Association's Corporate Counsel Section.
45. For example, the ABA's Section on Law Practice Management; the Wisconsin State Bar's
Section on Law Office Management.
46. For example, the State Bar of Michigan's Section on Alternative Dispute Resolution.
47. For example, the ABA's Legal Education and Admission to the Bar Section. This section,
established in 1893, was the ABA's fIrst. See generally SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA's FIRSf SECTION,
ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR (1993).
48. Each of the ABA's sections has more than 3000 members. See Stein, Mission: Membership,
supra note 13. The largest section, Litigation, has more than 56,000 members, although the Young
Lawyers Division, which is analogous to a section, has more than 107,000 members. See id. For reports
on ABA section and division activities, see Pasken, supra note 38, at C3-C21. One of the larger state
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twenty or more sections. 49 In general, a majority of association members
belong to at least one section. Large sections carry out many of their activities
through their own subcommittees.50
Unlike sections, committees are typically composed of members appointed
by the bar association leadership. The primary goal of these committees is
rarely to benefit their members, but rather to provide services to the general
membership or to some outside public group, to maintain cooperative relations
with other professions or organizations, or to develop and encourage needed
law reforms in a particular area. Typical committees include those on
Professional Ethics, Continuing Legal Education, General Practice, Judicial
Selection, Lawyer Referral Services, and Legal Aid. 51
Major bar associations generally have as many or more committees as they
do sections. 52 The range of committees is usually wide and differs from
association to association. 53 Committees are normally much smaller than
sections, generally having fifty or fewer members. Many committees issue
reports, have their own publications, and lobby or litigate to further their
objectives. Many committees, especially those overseeing programs with
considerable administrative work, have staff employees assigned to help them.
In addition to sections and permanent standing committees, major
comprehensive bar associations have a miscellany of other organizational
subunits. Occasionally, ad hoc task forces may be created to investigate a
particular problem and report back to the leadership or take other action. 54
Units of staff employees reporting to the executive director or other full-time
bar association sections is the Texas Bar Association's Litigation Section, with more than 7000
members. See John F. Nichols, litigation Section Repon, 58 TEx. B.J. 748 (1995).
49. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, § 2. The llIinois State Bar Association and the State Bar
of Texas have 37 sections each. See id. The ABA has 22 sections and five divisions, which are
analogous to sections. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 31-39. The ABA's divisions are
Government and Public Sector Lawyers, Judicial Administration, Law Students, Senior Lawyers, and
Young Lawyers. See id.
50. The ABA's Litigation Section, for example, has 44 subcommittees, most of which focus on a
particular litigation subpractice area. Section members may join subcommittees at no extra cost. For a
list of section subcommittees, see Section Newsletter, LIDG. NEWS, Oct. 1994, at 5.
51. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 39-51.
52. The Bar Association of San Francisco, for example, has 78 committees and 35 sections, while
the Florida Bar Association has 56 committees and 20 sections. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2,
§ 2. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has 181 committees and no sections. See id.
53. The range of bar association committees is illustrated by the Connecticut Bar Association.
Among its 44 committees are the following: Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, Insurance
Programs for the Bar, Law Office Management, Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (aiding lawyers with
substance abuse problems), Legal Assistants, Liaison With State Courts, Standards of Title, Gender Bias
in the Profession, and Veterans' and Military Affairs. See CONN. B. ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORTS OF
COMMITTEES AND SECfIONS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1994-95 (1995) [hereinafter CONNECfICUT
REPORTS].
54. The Louisiana State Bar Association's Task Force on Women in the Courts and the Mississippi
Bar's Task Force on the Criminal Justice System are two examples. See Board of Governors Synopsis
of Minutes, 42 LA. B.J. 550 (1995); James L. Robertson & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Bar Committee
Undenakes Rewrite of Criminal Code, MISS. LAW., May-June 1994, at 12.
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staff officials may be assigned to execute the more mundane administrative
operations of an association, like making arrangements for association meetings
and conferences, distributing association publications, maintaining current
membership records, and billing members for annual dues and section fees.
The largest associations, especially the ABA, have complex administrative staff
structures for association operations. ss This complexity is due to both the
large size of memberships and the broad range of programs that these
associations administer.
Many of the comprehensive bar associations have close ties with local,
state, or national foundations. These foundations, which are funded largely by
donations and bequests, often contribute substantially to bar association
projects. The American Bar Endowment, for example, an organization
established by the ABA to advance research and education on the administra-
tion of justice, is the principal funding source of the American Bar Foundation,
the largest empirical research center on law and legal institutions in the United
States.S6 Similar foundations have been established by other bar associa-
tions.S7
The American Bar Foundation is not as useful as it could be, either to the
ABA or to bar associations generally. Bar associations need more accurate and
complete data on the effectiveness of American legal institutions and the
problems facing both American lawyers and the agencies and organizations
.with which American lawyers regularly interact. While some American Bar
Foundation studies are of value to bar associations, sa many are useless to the
associations, whatever merit they may have as contributions to social science. S9
55. The ABA, for example, has a Service Center to answer member inquiries, a Legal Technology
Resource Center to aid members in effective uSe of office computers and other equipment, and a
Member Advantage Program to give member discounts on many goods and services, from rental cars
to fax machines. See TEN SMART WAYS TO MAXIMIZE YOUR ABA MEMBERSHIP, supra note 23. The
ABA also administers a Fund for Justice and Education, which raises over $20 million a year to aid
ABA public service programs. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 70-73.
56. The annual budget of the American Bar Foundation in 1994-95 was $4,587,681, of which
$3,090,500 came from the American Bar Endowment. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION 39 (1995) [hereinafter ABF REPORT]. The American Bar Endowment gave the ABA's
Fund for Justice and Education, its other grant recipient, $1,590,500 during this period. Much of the
Endowment's income comes from an insurance program it sponsors for ABA members, under which
a portion of the insurance policy dividends revert to the Endowment. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note
31, at 73-74; Making a Difference: The American Bar Endowmenl. 1995, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 106.
57. See. e.g., the Cincinnati Bar Foundation. This foundation was founded in 1961 by the
Cincinnati Bar Association. See Cincinnati Bar Foundation Annual Report. 1994-1995, in CINCINNATI
BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT 23 (1995).
58. Studies made under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation by Barbara Curran, Terence
Halliday, John Heinz, and Robert Nelson have been particularly relevant to bar association concerns.
59. See, for example, the recent listing of working papers, publications, and presentations by
Foundation personnel in ABF REPORT, supra note 56, at 23-30. One measure of the foundation's social
scientific bias is the disproportionate number of its research staff with Ph.D.s in history or the social
sciences rather than law degrees. Of the 24 members of this staff in 1995, 15 were lacking in law
degrees. See id. at 35. In addition, most of the foundation's visiting research fellows were social
scientists. See id.
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While a significant organizational feature of the comprehensive bar
associations is their independence, many of them maintain connections with
other organized bar groups. The ABA, for instance, maintains cooperative ties
with state and local bar associations-and even with some specialty bar
associations.. The association distributes useful information and commentary60
to state and local bar groups and has both a division and a committee to
promote and coordinate contact with state and local bar associations. 61 In
addition, the ABKs legislative body, the House of Delegates, has representa-
tives from state, larger local, and some specialty bar associations.62 State bar
associations also make outreach efforts, including meetings between state and
local bar leaders,63 and newsletters and other publications directed to local bar
association members.
Despite these efforts by the ABA and other associations, bar association
activities remain poorly integrated and unduly duplicative. In addition, the
exchange among associations of information pertaining to many matters of
common concern is inadequate. Data on the legal profession and information
on the successes and failures of organizational and programmatic innovations
have often been insufficiently circulated.64 As a result of these problems, the
associations are less efficient and influential than they might be, particularly in
education programs directed at lawyers and the public, and in law reform
efforts at the federal level.
One form of bar association organization, the unified state bar, has become
a contentious issue in some states where it has been instituted. Many lawyers
in unified bar states are opposed to mandatory membership due to positions
taken by the associations on public and professional issues, the regulatory
restrictions and obligations imposed on members, and the amount of annual
dues that the associations charge.6S Opposition to the unified bar format has
60. Such materials include The BarLeader, a bimonthly periodical published by the ABA, and the
Bar Activities Inve1ltory, a compilation of detailed statistical data about state and local bar associations.
The most recent version of the latter was issued in 1995. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2.
61. The division is the Division for Bar Services. The committee is the Bar Activities and Services
Committee. On the division, see ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 9; and on the committee, see id.
at 40.
62. Each state bar association and each local bar association with more than 2000 members is
entitled to a minimum of one delegate. The largest state associations, however, can have up to six
delegates. See ABA CONSf. § 6.4. The specialty bar associations and other organizations entitled to
delegates are listed in id. § 6.8. The representation of other organizations in the House of Delegates was
authorized in 1936 in response to calls for a federation of bar associations similar to that in the medical
profession. See HURSf, supra note 8, at 291-92.
63. A number of states have a separate bar presidents' committee or council composed of local bar
presidents and chaired by the state bar president or president-elect. See. e.g., Report ofthe Connecticut
Council OfBar Presidents, in CONNECTICUT REPORTS, supra note 53, at 42.
64. ABA meetings and ABA publications like The Bar Leader ful some of this need for the
exchange of information, but much more is needed.
65. For an excellent analysis of the unified bar concept, see Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence
of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1.
Schneyer concludes that the unified bar should be abolished. Wisconsin's experience with the unified
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been particularly strong in California and Wisconsin. In the spring of 1996,
pursuant to a legislative directive, a plebescite of all California lawyers was
held to determine if the unified form should be retained. 66 Sixty-five percent
of those voting supported the unified bar. 67 In 1988, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court suspended mandatory lawyer membership in its state bar after a federal
district court ruled that such membership violated the First Amendment. 68
Despite considerable resistance among lawyers, the Wisconsin court reinstated
the unified bar in 199269 after the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of this form in Keller v. State Bar of California. 70 Opposition
to the unified bar concept has surfaced recently in other states as well. 71
The problems of unified bars have been aggravated by judicial decisions.
Principal among these is the Court's 1990 decision in Keller, which, while
upholding the constitutionality of the form, held that the First Amendment
prohibits a unified bar from using a member's dues to fund political or
ideological activities with which the member disagrees. 72 The Court held that
form, he asserts. demonstrates that too many difficulties arise in trying to maintain "an organization that
is at once a voluntary private association, a closed shop union, and a public agency." Id. at 87. He
claims that the form has led to uncertainty about the Wisconsin bar association's powers, has required
the state supreme court to devote too much time and resources to internal bar disputes and bar
housekeeping problems, and has worsened court-bar relations. See id. at 96. For other views critical of
the unified bar format, see Bradley A. Smith, The limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the
Unified Bar Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1994), John Carson, Reinventing
the State Bar ofCalifornia, L.A. LAW., May 1995, at II, Edmund D. Kahn. A Unified Bar, Can: How
the Mandatory State Bar Union Spends Our Money, ARIZ. Arr'y, Nov. 1995, at 22, Stephanie J.
Johnston, Members to Unified Bars: Get Back to Basics, B. LEADER. July-Aug. 1993. at 5.
66. See 1995 CAL. LEGIS. SERVICE ch. 782, § 2 (West). The outcome of the plebiscite was
advisory only.
67. See Nancy McCarthy, Lawyers Vote 2 to 1 to Keep California's State Bar Unified, CAL. ST.
B.J.• July 1996, at 1. Fifty-one percent of eligible lawyers voted. See id. Before the plebiscite, there
was a spirited, often acrimonious, campaign. For the arguments on both sides of the issue, see Carson,
supra note 65, and Nancy McCarthy, Forces Mobilize to Decide Bar's Fate, CAL. ST. BJ., Dec. 1995,
at 17.
68. See Levine v. Supreme Court, 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding unified bar
unconstitutional).
69. See In re State Bar, 485 N.W.2d 225 (Wis. 1992); see also Trayton L. Lathrop, A Comment
on the June 17, 1992 Compulsory Bar Association Opinions ofthe Wisconsin Supreme Court, 40 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 288 (1993). On opposition within the Wisconsin bar to reunification, see Smith, supra
note 65, at 68-70. See also Nancy McCarthy, In Wisconsin, The Battle to Kill Mandatory Bar Fails,
CAL. ST. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 1 (discussing long history of controversy in Wisconsin over mandatory
state bar).
70. 496 U.S. 1 (1990); see also Gibson v. Florida Bar, 502 U.S. 104 (1991), denying cert. to 906
F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1990).
71. See, e.g., Robert Cecil Flick, 1994 Oregon State Bar Economic Survey, 36 LAW OFF. ECON.
& MGMT. 362, 377 (1995) (reporting that 28% of Oregon lawyers surveyed would not join bar
association if membership was voluntary); Stephanie J. Johnston, Members Continue to Sing "The
Unified Bar Blues, • B. LEADER, May-June 1995, at 8 (discussing proposed legislation to deunify Rhode
Island Bar Association); Annual Lawyer's Survey, MISS. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 30 (reporting survey
results in which almost one-third of Mississippi lawyers opposed unified bar).
72. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 5. For different evaluations of Keller, see David F. Addicks,
Renovating the Bar After Keller v. State Bar of California: A Proposalfor Strict limits on Compulsory
Fee Expenditure, 25 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 681 (1991), David Luban, The Disengagement ofthe Legal
Profession: Keller v. State Bar of California, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 163, James B. Lake, Note, Lawyers.
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a unified association may only use member dues to fund activities germane to
regulating the legal profession and to improving the quality of legal services,
as these activities are consistent with the purposes of the unified form. 73
Efforts to comply with Keller by many of the unified bar associations have
caused confusion, expense, and increased dissatisfaction with the unified
format. 74
In sum, the major comprehensive bar associations, whether unified or not,
are not organized in a way that maximizes their efficiency or efficacy. The
structure and nature of the highest positions in the organization mean that the
top leadership is often weak, while the lack of coordination between different
associations results in duplication and inefficiency. It remains to be seen how
these issues affect the particular programs of each association, if at all. Part III,
therefore, examines and evaluates the kinds of programs usually pursued by
major comprehensive bar associations.
III. PROGRAMS
The major comprehensive bar associations seek to fulfill their policy
objectives through an extraordinary number and variety of programs relating
to the justice system generally, and to the legal profession in particular. While
the bar associations have the potential for great influence, their programs have
mixed records of success.
The large number and variety of programs conducted by the major
comprehensive bar associations reflect the associations' perception of
themselves as representatives and guardians of the entire legal profession. In
addition, the associations' objective of building and sustaining large and
Please Check Your First Amendment Rights at the Bar: The Problem ofState-Mandated Bar Dues and
Compelled Speech, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1833 (1993). For a review of other case law on unified
bar associations, see John S. Skilton, litigation Against the Unified Bar, B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1994,
at 12.
73. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
74. Some unified bar associations have sought to comply with Keller by raising non-dues funds or
by introducing dues reduction options. In Crosetto v. State Bar, 12 F.3d 1396 (7th Cir. 1993), the
Seventh Circuit upheld a Wisconsin rule enabling any state bar member to withhold the percentage of
bar dues that the state bar asserts are for political or ideological activities. On post-Keller developments
in Wisconsin, see John S. Skilton, President's Perspective, To Speak or Not to Speak, WIS. LAW., Oct.
1995, at 5. In Florida and Michigan, the state bar associations adapted to Keller by prohibiting a range
of bar lobbying and other activities. See Smith, supra note 65, at 50-58.
Proponents of the unified bar continue to maintain that unified bars can provide more and better
service to the legal profession and the public than voluntary bars can provide because they possess more
funds and greater authority. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 65, at 12; Harriet L. Tumey, A Unified Bar,
Pro: What's Right About It?, ARIZ. Arr'y, Nov. 1995, at 23. But see Larry J. Rector, Compelled
Financial Support of a Bar Association and the Attorney's First Amendment Rights: A Theoretical
Analysis, 66 NEB. L. REv. 762, 768-69 (1987); Schneyer, supra note 65, at 96-106; James Towery,
A 'Yes' Vote Means a Loss of Power, CAL. ST. B.J., May 1996, at 7; James Towery, Scare Tactics,
or Real Loss of Control?, CAL. ST. B.J., Apr. 1996, at 12.
205
HeinOnline -- 15 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 206 1996-1997
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 15: 193, 1996
inclusive memberships contributes to the range of programs offered.7s Indeed,
even the comprehensive associations that formerly were elitist and restrictive
in their memberships are now seeking to become more inclusive by attracting
members from all professional specialties and kinds of law offices and by
increasing the portion of their memberships composed of women and ethnic
and racial minorities. 76
The number and range of bar association programs is best revealed by a
brief review of the kinds of programs most commonly offered. The next few
Sections, therefore, highlight the kinds of programs offered and examine how
effectively bar associations achieve their policy goals. In particular, these
Sections examine legal education, professional conduct, the unauthorized
practice of law, legal services for the poor and persons of moderate means,
litigation, and substantive law reform.
A. Legal Education
All major comprehensive bar associations are heavily involved in the post-
admission legal education of lawyers. Some of these educational programs are
open to lawyers generally while others are available only to the offering
association's members. Continuing legal education programs are widely offered
and available to any lawyer who wishes to attend. 77 A course fee is usually
charged for these programs.78 CLE credit is given in those jurisdictions with
75. In addition to the programs they offer, all the major comprehensive bar associations offer some
goods and services-such as office equipment, telephone service, automobile rentals, and equipment
leasing-at reduced cost. Some state bar associations have helped form insurance companies to provide
malpractice insurance to lawyers on favorable terms. See, e.g., Thomas V. Flaherty, President's Page,
Sources of Parental Pride, W. VA. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 4 (describing formation in late 1980s of
Attorneys Liability Protection Society by consortium of state bar associations); see also 1995 Report of
the Professional liability Fund, ORE. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 1995, at 33 (commenting on mandatory
malpractice insurance provided to all active Oregon lawyers). A few bar associations, mostly large local
associations, also provide substantial law library facilities and restaurant facilities to their members.
76. On the evolution of one major local bar association, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, toward a larger and more inclusive membership, see generally POWELL, supra note 1. As
the number of female lawyers has rapidly increased, major comprehensive bar associations have made
special efforts to fJllleadership posts and other positions of responsibility with women. Roberta Cooper
Ramo, for example, became the fIrst female president of the ABA when she was elected in 1995, and
women led the Connecticut Bar Association for three successive years, from 1992 to 1995.
Many associations have also sought to publicize and discourage gender discrimination within the
legal profession generally. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, ELUSIVE EQUAUTY: THE
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1996); ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF'N,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS FACfOR (1995). Similar efforts have been made
with respect to racial discrimination in the profession. See, e.g., The Arizona Minority Counsel Program:
Melting the Plexiglass Ceiling, ARIz. Arr'y, Feb. 1996, at 46.
77. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, §§ 3-VII, 4-VII (compiling statistical data on bar
association CLE programs). Bar associations do not have a monopoly on CLE; other organizations, like
the American Law Institute, and some law schools offer their own CLE courses as well. See Lawrence
Osborne, CLE Business: Academic Centers and the Sun-Blessed Cashing In, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19,
1996, at 15.
78. See Susan O. Scheutzow, Quality CLE: A Tradition ofOur Bar Association, CLEVELAND B.J.,
June-July 1995, at 16 (stressing that CLE fees are major source of bar association income). The Los
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CLE requirements, and credit toward cenification granted in jurisdictions with
lawyer cenification programs. The subjects of instruction vary greatly, but they
often cover developments in an important field of law or useful techniques in
a particular area of practice.79 The traditional CLE approach offers practical,
hands-on information and advice likely to help in representing clients.
Supplementary instructional materials are distributed in many CLE courses;
some courses also make available instructional audiotapes or videotapes. 80
While many of these materials can be used for self-study, CLE offerings
commonly have one or more class instruction sessions. Most instructors are
experienced practitioners, though occasionally a law professor or judge will act
as a teacher. Classes are generally given in lecture form and only rarely are
examinations administered. Occasionally, bar associations have offered special
CLE programs for those willing to take on pro bono cases but lacking a
background in poverty law matters.
In the thirty-eight states with CLE requirements, all but a few exempted
lawyers must regularly take CLE courses. 81 In most of these states, the
requirement calls for fifteen hours of instruction each year in a wide range of
approved courses.82 Much of the mandatory CLE instruction is given by or
Angeles Bar Association recently instituted an innovative arrangement allowing members to attend most
association CLE programs for an annual charge. See John Carson, President's Page, Meeting Our
Members, CLE Needs, L.A. LAW., Oct. 1994, at 9.
79. In 1995 and 1996, for example, the New York State Bar Association held over 225 CLE
seminars on 42 subjects at various locations in the state. These seminars covered such subjects as estate
planning and will drafting; the commencement of civil litigation; basic criminal practice; the litigation
of automobile accident cases; New York gains, transfer and mortgage taxation; federal and state
commercial litigation; and legal aspects of trade in the Americas. See NYSBA: Resourcesfor Professional
Development, in NYSBA REPORT TO THE MEMBERSHIP 10 (pamphlet), included in N.Y. ST. B.J., July-
Aug. 1996, at 32.
80. The State Bar of Wisconsin publishes books on Wisconsin practice and is also the nation's
largest producer of video training tapes for law practice management, law office training, and client
education. In a recent ten-year period, the association distributed 25,000 videotapes, many to law firms
outside Wisconsin. See WIS. LAW., Nov. 1994, at 40 (advertisement). More typical of state bar
association self-study programs is that of the Connecticut Bar Association, which offers nearly fifty
packages of videotapes and supplemental written materials on such topics as drafting contracts, estate
administration, title searching, elder law practice, and accounting for lawyers. A complete list of
offerings appears in CONNECTICUT B. Ass'N, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SELF STUDY PACKAGES
(1995).
81. See Rocio T. Aliaga, The Framing ofthe Debate on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education:
District of Columbia Bar's Consideration ofMCLE, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1145, 1145 n.l (1995).
In some states, failure to fulfil the mandatory CLE requirement results in suspension. See, e.g., No
CLE, No License, TENN. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 8 (reporting suspension of 62 Tennessee lawyers,
many working out of state, for failure to fulfil CLE requirement).
82. The Idaho Bar Association, for example, approves programs for which mandatory CLE credit
will be given. A total of 932 CLE programs throughout the United States has been approved for credit
in Idaho. See ADVOCATE (Idaho Bar Association), Sept. 1995, at 22 (listing CLE programs). In some
states, lawyers are required to take instruction in professional responsibility as part of their CLE
programs. See CLE J. & REG., Mar. 1995, at 17. All law schools accredited by the ABA are required
to teach professional responsibility as well. See STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard
302 (1991). In California, lawyers who have been disciplined are required to attend an eight-hour ethics
course and to take an examination, unless otherwise ordered by the state supreme court. See Discipline
Now Requires Ethics School, CAL. ST. B.J., Nov. 1995, at 29.
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under· the auspices of bar associations. In recent years many CLE programs
have been offered by the ABA, in conjunction with state and local bar
associations, through closed-circuit television at numerous sites around the
country. Some associations also administer specialist lawyer certification
programs with instructional and examination components.83 In addition, some
bar associations have established mentoring programs so that young lawyers
can seek the help of experienced practitioners in establishing their practices. 84
While additional lectures, workshops and educational publications are not
formally included as CLE offerings, bar associations do provide them for
members. Advanced specialist education and annual membership meetings with
educational sessions are testimony to the importance of education to bar
associations. Indeed, expanding member knowledge of the law and legal
institutions is a major objective of bar associations whether through formal
CLE programs or otherwise.
This objective extends to future lawyers as well, through association
involvement with law school education. A bar association will occasionally
provide moot court or other instructional assistance to law schools, and some
offer financial assistance to these educational institutions. 8S The most
significant aspects of bar associations' involvement with law schools, however,
are the ABA's long-standing program of setting law school accreditation
standards, approving schools that are in accord with these standards, and
making periodic accreditat~on inspections of most schools. 86 In most states,
83. See generally STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF SPECIALTY CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS FOR
LAWYERS (1992). Specialist certification of lawyers resembles board certification of physicians: While
certification does not usually provide for exclusive practice rights. it can aid in attracting clients. In
California, where certification is available in eight fields. there are 3000 certified lawyer specialists. See
449 Attorneys Pass Exam to Be Certified as Specialists, CAL. ST. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 3. In Florida,
where the state bar allocates certification responsibility to specialist committees, there are 11 specialist
fields. See Standing Policies of the Board of Legal Specialization and Education. Board Certified
Lawyers, FLA. B.J., Sept. 1995, at 47.
84. See. e.g., Freddie Baird, A Step in the Right Direction: Mentor Programfor Lawyers. 58 TEX.
B.J. 144, 144-46 (1995) (discussing mentoring program of State Bar of Texas); Ken Howard, Mentoring
Program Will Aid Transition from Law Student to Lawyer. ADVOCATE (Idaho Bar Association), Apr.
1995, at 6 (discussing similar program in Idaho).
85. In Georgia, for example, a state bar committee holds orientation sessions on professionalism
for first-year students in four Georgia law schools. See President's Report, GA. ST. B.J., Fall 1994, at
48.
86. The ABA House of Delegates makes accreditation decisions based on the recommendations of
the Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar. See ABA CONST. § 45.9. For an historical
review of ABA law school accreditation by the association's consultant on legal education, see James
P. White, The American Bar Association Law School Approval Process: A Century Plus of Public
Service, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 283 (1995).
The ABA's accreditation standards were recently revised following an antitrust consent decree. See
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1996). The consent decree placed limits on the number
of law school personnel that can serve on the accreditation committee, prohibited the ABA's setting
faculty salary requirements, and required a review of accreditation requirements in six areas. See Henry
J. Reske, One Antitrust Battle Over, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 44; Richard C. Reuben, Accreditation
on Review, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 107. The ABA's involvement, however, remains significant. See
generally Andy Portinga, Note, ABA Accreditation ofLaw Schools: An Antitrust Analysis, 29 U. MICH.
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statute or court rules mandate that only graduates of ABA approved law
schools may take the bar examination and become qualified to practice law.87
Recently, the ABA has become involved in another significant effort to
influence law school education. The impetus for this endeavor came from
proposals made in a 1992 book-long report by an ABA task force. 88 The
report, often referred to as the MacCrate Report after its chairman, distin-
guished New York City lawyer and former ABA president, Robert MacCrate,
has generated extensive discussion among practicing lawyers and law teachers.
Among other things, the report strongly urges that law schools give more
attention and care to developing lawyering skills and values in the training of
their students. It also suggests that more consideration be given to skills and
values instruction in the law school accreditation process. While the report is
consistent with a growing movement toward increased emphasis on skills
training by law schools, it has elicited a negative reaction from many in the
law school community.89 There is an often unstated opinion among many law
teachers that the practicing bar should not dictate to law schools what or how
to teach.
Bar associations do not restrict their legal educational efforts to lawyers and
law students. Many associations, for example, have instituted informational
programs directed to elementary, high school or college students,90 designed
to increase respect for the law and legal institutions. 91 And there are programs
directed to community groups or the public at large intended to provide free
J.L. REFORM 635 (1995-96).
87. See generally ABA SEmON OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO lHE BAR & NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, 1995-96
(1995) [hereinafter BAR ADMISSION GUIDE].
88. See THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND lHE PROFESSION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATION CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter THE MACCRATE
REPORT]. In 1994, the ABA House of Delegales recommended the irnplemenIation of the Iask force's
report. See Richard C. Reuben, Changing Legal Education, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 13.
In 1996, another ABA body, following a survey oflaw school ethics and professionalism courses
and programs, made deIailed recommendations for enhanced professionalism training at the
undergraduale, law school, and post-admission levels. See ABA SEmON OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING
AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM]. The Committee viewed its report as an· eXlension of THE
MACCRATE REPORT. See id. at 1.
89. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Repon: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of
American Legal Education, 43 J. LEG. ED. 157 (1993); Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public
Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REv. 573 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the
Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing From the MacCrate Repon-ofSkills, Legal Science and
Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593 (1993); see also THE MACCRATE REPORT: BUILDING
THE EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg
eds., 1994) (compiling papers from 1993 conference sponsored by ABA, University of MinnesoIa and
West Publishing Co.); Symposium on the 21st Century Lawyer, 69 WASH. L. REv. 505 (1994).
90. See ABA INVENTORY, supra nOIe 2, §§ 3-XII, 4-XII.
91. See, e.g., Julie Gamble Warner, Getting a Foot in the Door, TENN. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at
13 (describing Tennessee program where lawyers work with primary and secondary school leachers to
develop law-relaIed leaching malerial).
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advice and assistance over the telephone. 92 One of the main objectives of
these education programs is to respond to media attacks on the legal profession
that the associations consider baseless. 93
Bar association educational efforts directed at licensed lawyers are of mixed
educational value. They clearly help to fill a major need, as legal education
should not end with law school. But the programs typically offered by bar
associations are most helpful to lawyers recently admitted to practice or to
those in the process of shifting specialties. Except as a means of keeping up
with new developments, there is little that the experienced practitioner can
learn from the usual how-to-do-it kind of educational presentation. Other
weaknesses in bar association education are that many presentations lack
thorough preparation, and little time is accorded to meaningful audience
participation. Despite the advantages of continuing education as a bar
association funding device or as a public relations ploy intended to show that
lawyers are keeping current with new developments in the law, making CLE
mandatory has not expanded the learning process effectively. Where it exists,
the benefits of required attendance are often undermined by the limited number
of required credit hours and the limited nature of learning demands.
In the other highly important sphere of legal education, education by the
law schools, bar association influence is quite limited. Although historically the
ABA was a powerful force in establishing higher admission, staffing, library,
and teaching standards for American law schools,94 as the law schools became
more powerful and the Association of American Law Schools became their
primary representative body, the influence of the ABA in legal education
declined. In sustaining law school accreditation standards generally favored by
the Association of American Law Schools and most of its members, however,
the ABA continues to be a valuable ally. But the significance of the ABA's
accreditation criteria may be weakened by a recent antitrust consent decree,
resulting in a possible cutback in standards by a number of law schools. 95
Overall, the effectiveness of the comprehensive bar associations in
furthering legal education varies. The associations provide a significant number
of helpful educational opportunities of which many practicing lawyers take
advantage to improve their knowledge and ability. But the educational quality
92. See ABA COMM'N ON NONLAWYER PRAcnCE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED
SITUATIONS 101-03 (1995); ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, §§ 3- XII, 4-XII. Some associations also
publish brochures for lawyers to give to clients to help answer common legal questions. See, e.g., LA.
B.J., Aug. 1995, at 132 (listing Louisiana State Bar Association brochures); MAINE B.J., Mar. 1995,
at 83 (listing Maine State Bar Association brochures).
93. See Roberta Cooper Ramo, President's Message, Let's Not Take It Anymore, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1996, at 6.
94. See generally BAR ADMISSION GUIDE, supra note 87; ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 122-60 (1953); ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, at 92-130, 172-90,205-31 (1983).
95. See supra note 86. .
210
HeinOnline -- 15 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 211 1996-1997
Bar Associations
of offerings differs considerably. The published and taped materials generally
are excellent; many of the in-person lecture presentations are mediocre. As
they now stand, mandatory CLE programs are a waste of time for many of
those required to attend.
B. Professional Conduct
Comprehensive bar associations have also given extensive attention to
encouraging and enforcing ethical and professionally responsible behavior by
members of the bar. Different programs exist for dealing with different aspects
of this ·concern. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, drafted by an ABA
commission, the Kutak Commission, and adopted in 1983 by the ABA House
of Delegates, set forth in considerable detail how lawyers should behave in a
broad range of professional situations.96 With some variation from state to
state, the Model Rules have been adopted as rules of court in most states.97
A minority of states still follow an earlier set of model standards, the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which was adopted by the ABA in
1969.98
Questions have arisen in a host of situations as to what the Rules and the
Code mean and how they should be applied. A considerable body of case law
has developed construing the Rules and the Code, and a few provisions have
been held unconstitutional. 99 To clarify ambiguous sections of the Rules or
Code, it is a common practice for the professional ethics committees of bar
96. See generally ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L REsPoNSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HisrORY OF THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr (1987); Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics:
The Making ofa Modem Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACflCES 95-143 (Robert
L. Nelson et al. OOs., 1992).
The ABA has also adopted a Model Code of Judicial Conduct, setting forth ethical obligations for
judges. This code has been adopted as rules of court in most states. See generally LiSA L. MILORD, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE (1992).
In addition to the ABA's model codes of conduct, some specialist bar associations have adopted
codes of their own to deal with ethical issues encountered in their specialty practices. See. e.g, BOUNDS
OF ADVOCACY, STANDARDS OF CONDucr (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991). See
generally Stanley Sporkin, The Needfor Separate Codes ofProfessional COnductfor Various Specialties.
7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); Mark H. Aultman, Cracking Codes, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
735 (1993) (responding to Sporkin).
97. Many of the changes made to the Model Rules in the course of adoption were proposed by state
or local bar associations.
98. California is an exception, having adopted neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code. In
many ways, however, the California Rules of Professional Conduct resemble the Model Rules and
Model Code.
Where adopted, provisions of the Rules and the Code (except those stated to be aspirational only)
are binding on lawyers and those who violate them are subject to disciplinary sanctions. See CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 49-53 (1986).
99. Restrictions on lawyer advertising and client solicitation have been especially vulnerable to
constitutional attack. See. e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising).
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aSSOCiatIOns to give written interpretive opinions. loo These opinions, though
not binding, are frequently cited favorably by the courts. Moreover, if the
opinions are adhered to, those who requested them are unlikely to be charged
with unprofessional conduct. The usual sanctions available for Rule or Code
violations are disbarment, suspension from practice for a period of time, or
reprimand. 101 These sanctions are often publicized in bar journals and official
court reports.
As the Model Rules stress what lawyers must do rather than what might be
more ethically desirable, the ABA and some of the other comprehensive bar
associations have prepared creeds of professionalism to guide further lawyers
in their conduct with clients and others. I02 The creeds are much shorter than
the Model Rules or Model Code and, unlike the latter, are generally considered
aspirational rather than obligatory. They have had much less impact on
lawyers' behavior than the Model Rules or Model Code. The creeds raise
problems due to the lack of unanimity about ideal lawyer behavior. 103 In
addition, it is not clear whether the creeds will remain fully voluntary or
whether the courts will consider them relevant authority in disciplinary cases,
thereby giving them a mandatory aura.
The major comprehensive bar associations have not only been heavily
involved in developing and interpreting standards of professional conduct for
lawyers, but many of the associations also play significant roles in enforcing
the standards. In some states, including some of the largest, the disciplinary
process is principally a state bar association responsibility, although the state's
high court may and commonly does determine the final sanction on appeal. 104
100. See Mark F. Howard, The Bar Association Ethics Committee: Beyond the Ivory Tower, N.H.
B.J., June 1995, at 23-25. In California, the state bar operates a confidential ethics hotline for lawyers;
in 1994, the service received 20,000 inquiries. See CAL. ST. B.J., Aug. 1995, at 37.
101. For statistics on lawyer disciplinary sanctions, see infra note 137.
102. About half the state bar associations, many local associations, and even some courts have
promulgated creeds of this sort, often referred to as pledges or oaths. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's
Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REv. 259, 278 n.74 (1995). For the ABA
Pledge of Professionalism, approved in 1988, see THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1996
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 623-33 (1996).
103. See Atkinson, supra note 102, at 303-17.
104. In California, although ultimate authority over lawyer discipline is in the state supreme court,
much of the responsibility for the lawyer disciplinary process is in the State Bar of California, a unified
state bar association. See CAL. SUP. CT. R. 951 to 954 (1996); William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of
Professionalism and the Politics ofSelf-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 485,
593-96 (1995). California is unique in having a separate state bar court. The court has seven full-time
judges and its own review panel. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6085.5, 6086.65 (West 1990).
Alaska and Florida are among the other states with substantial bar association responsibility for lawyer
disciplinary enforcement. See ALASKA B.R. 10 (1986); FLA. SUP. CT. R. 3 to 3.2 (1993). In a few
states, the state bar's board of governors retains adjudicative functions. See LAWYER REGULATION FOR
A NEW CENTURY 93 (Report of the ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement 1992)
[hereinafter McKAy COMM'N REPORT]. In Mississippi, the state bar association has developed an
innovative consumer assistance program to deal with minor complaints against lawyers, the more serious
complaints proceeding to traditional disciplinary institutions. See Glen Waddle, The Mississippi Bar
Consumer Assistance Program-How It Works, MISS. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12.
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In these states, complaint processing, investigation, prosecution, and initial
determination of sanctions are state bar association responsibilities. lOS These
tasks constitute one of the associations' most expensive operations. I06 The
current trend, however, is for lawyer disciplinary enforcement functions to be
performed by government bodies rather than by the bar. These government
bodies screen and investigate complaints, and in cases with sufficient evidence
of a serious infraction, seek disbarment or other sanctions from the courts.
Whether or not bar associations are deeply involved in lawyer disciplinary
enforcement, however, most states fund their lawyer disciplinary systems
almost entirely from assessments on lawyers. 107
Over the past twenty-five years or so, the ABA has had considerable
influence on the expansion and restructuring of the lawyer disciplinary process.
This influence has come largely through the reports and recommendations of
two highly respected ABA bodies, the Clark Committee lO8 and the McKay
Commission!09 and from the ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement. 110 The ABA's proposals have helped persuade government
authorities in some states to provide lawyer disciplinary systems ultimately
controlled by the judiciary, not by legislatures or bar associations, III and
enforced by full-time disciplinary counsel. l12 In many states, however, the
existing systems still fall short of what the ABA considers desirable.
105. This, of course, does not extend to some kinds of lawyer misconduct, like criminal
prosecutions, contempt matters, and malpractice cases, in which bar associations generally have no
involvement. Many state bar associations are involved with malpractice insurance, however. See infra
notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
106. The State Bar of California spends more money on disciplinary matters than any other state
bar association. In 1996, for example, 70% of its $46 million budget was earmarked for lawyer
discipline. See Budget: Courage or Folly, supra note 26. By comparison, in Oregon, an adjoining
unified bar state, only 32.4% of bar members' dues is allocated to lawyer discipline. See Celene Green,
A Glance at Your OSB, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 1995, at 5 (insert).
107. See McKAy COMM'N REPORT, supra note 104, at 90.
108. The Clark Committee, which made its report in 1970, gained its name from its chairman,
former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. The committee's formal name was the
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement.
109. The commission was called the McKay Commission after its initial chairman, Robert McKay.
The commission's formal name was the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement. In its
appendix, the commission's report reviewed the considerable progress made in implementing the Clark
Committee's recommendations. See McKAy COMM'N REPORT, supra note 104, at 89-129.
110. These rules were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1989, replacing STANDARDS FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1979) and MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1985). Also, an ABA commission has developed written STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1986).
Ill. There is resistance in some states, however, to reducing substantially bar association
responsibility for the lawyer disciplinary system. In Washington, for example, a joint task force of the
bench and bar recently rejected a proposal, made by an ABA audit tearn, to shift responsibility for
lawyer discipline from the bar association to the state supreme court. See Lindsay T. Thompson,
Refining Lawyer Discipline in Washington: A Multifaceted Approach, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Aug. 1995,
at 15.
112. In California, there are more than 60 such counsel; in New York, there are more than 30; and
Florida and Pennsylvania each have more than 20. See MCKAy COMM'N REPORT, supra note 104, at
90.
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There are other programs commonly carried on by comprehensive bar
associations that also concern the professional behavior of lawyers. These
programs aim either at reducing possibilities of professional misconduct or at
reducing its adverse consequences. The programs include character and fitness
screening of applicants to the bar, aiding lawyers with substance abuse
problems, providing client security funds, and sponsoring lawyer malpractice
insurance. Bar associations have a long history of investigating the moral
fitness of those seeking admission to the bar. 113 The purpose of these
screening procedures is to exclude from admission those who are perceived as
professional conduct risks. In some states, these character and fitness
investigations are conducted by state bar association representatives. 114 The
question of the requisite moral fitness to practice law has occasionally raised
difficult questions. Courts have had to consider, for example, whether
admission should be denied based on past affiliation with the Communist
Party, llS on evidence of sexual misconduct with minors, ll6 or on suspen-
sion from law school because of plagiarism. ll1
Many bar associations also make efforts to identify and provide peer
support and counseling referrals to lawyers with substance abuse problems. 118
These programs not only help save the careers of many impaired lawyers, but
they reduce the risks of professional misconduct. Client protection funds,
available to reimburse clients for lawyer misconduct, like misappropriation of
client property, also exist in nearly all stateS. ll9 In many instances, state bar
associations administer these funds, financing them with bar dues or lawyer
assessments. l20 Most of these funds have caps on total payment per claim,
ranging from $5000 to $200,000. 121 Many also have caps on how much will
113. See WOLFRAM, supra note 98, at 858-64; Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.I. 491 (1985).
114. In Michigan, for example, the State Bar Association Committee on Character and Fitness
conducts the investigations and reports its admission recommendations to the State Board of Law
Examiners. On request of an applicant, the board has authority to review any adverse recommendations.
See MICH. SUP. CT. R. 15 (1996).
115. See. e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (holding that mere
membership in Communist Party does not disqualify candidate from admission to practice law); ef.
e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (holding that refusal to answer questions
concerning membership in Communist Party may justify refusal of admission). See generally Rhode,
supra note 113, at 566-70.
116. See. e.g., Vaughn v. Board of Bar Exam'rs, 759 P.2d 1026 (Okla. 1988) (denying admission
to bar applicant because of alleged sexual relations with 14-year-olds when applicant was their teacher,
although criminal charges had been dismissed).
117. See. e.g. ,In re Zbiegien, 433N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1988) (holding single incident of plagiarism
in law school not sufficient to deny applicant admission).
118. See. e.g., State Bar of Texas Annual Committee Repons, 58 TEx. B.I. 732, 737 (1995)
(reporting that Texas Lawyers' Assistance Program has helped more than 1500 attorneys recover from
substance abuse problems since 1989).
119. See ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L REsPoNSIBILITY, CUENT PROTECTION FuND SURVEY at iii (1993).
As of 1993, all states except Maine and North Dakota had client protection funds. See id.
120. See id. at iv-v.
121. See id. at vi.
214
HeinOnline -- 15 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 215 1996-1997
Bar Associations
be paid per lawyer against whom claims are made, ranging from $5000 to
$800,000. 122
Client security funds raise a troublesome question: Why should lawyers
who behave pay for lawyers who do not? This, of course, is a question raised
by any form of mandated insurance coverage. Insurance marketed explicitly as
lawyer malpractice insurance is, in fact, available everywhere in the United
States, often sponsored by state bar associations. l23 This insurance coverage
is optional in all states except Oregon, where it is mandatory for lawyers
practicing within the state. 124
In approaching problems of professional condu~t, bar associations have
been influenced in recent years by a widely prevalent view among lawyers that
the bar is losing its sense of professionalism. l2S Just what is meant by
professionalism is often vague, but a variety of common behavioral traits have
been cited for evidence of its decline. l26 Matters often stressed include the
frequent lack of civility in lawyers' relations with opposing counsel and judges;
overly aggressive and confrontational tactics in litigation; and excessive
concern with profitability, causing both a decrease in client loyalty and internal
law firm collegiality and an increase in advertising and other promotional
efforts. According to these critics, law practice increasingly resembles business
in its goals, operations, and sense of service. Many within the profession
believe that bar associations have an obligation to help counter this trend,I27
122. See id.
123. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF'L LIAB. , LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
UPDATE, 1995, at 1.1-1.30 (1995).
124. See OR. REv. STAT. § 9.080(2)(a) (1995) (authorizing state bar association to require that
active members carry professional liability insurance). Current cost of this coverage is $1800 per year
per lawyer. See Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a
Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL Enncs 637,642 (1995).
125. See. e.g., " ... IN TIlE SPIRIT OF PuBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR TIlE REKINDLING OF
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (ABA Comm'n on Prof'lism Report 1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243
(1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PROF'LISM REPORT]; TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM,
supra note 88; Warren E. Burger. The Decline ofProfessionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 949 (1995);
Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 773 (reviewing COMM'N
ON PROF'LISM REPORT, supra); Edward F. Shea, The President's Comer, Professionalism, WASH. ST.
B. NEWS, Mar. 1996, at 15.
126. See, e.g., COMM'N ON PROF'LISM REPORT, supra note 125, at 261; MICHAEL J. KELLY,
LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN TIlE ORGANIZATION OF PRAcnCE 12-18 (1994); Robert L. Nelson
& David M. Trubek, Arenas ofProfessionalism: The Professional Ideologies ofLawyers in Context, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 96, at 177; Timothy P. Terrell & James H.
Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,' 41 EMORY L.J. 403 (1992). For criticisms of Terrell and
Wildman, see Richard C. Baldwin, "Rethinking Professionalism"-And Then living It!, 41 EMORY L.J.
433 (1992); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Rethinking "The Practice ofLaw, • 41 EMORY L.J. 451 (1992);
Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J.
473 (1992); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Professionalism and Community: A Response to Terrell and Wildman,
41 EMORY LJ. 485 (1992); Jack L. Sammons, Jr., & Linda H. Edwards, Honaring the Law in
Communities of Force: Terrell and Wildman's Teleology ofPractice, 41 EMORY L.J. 489 (1992).
127. See, e.g., COMM'N ON PROF'LISM REPORT, supra note 125, at 271-90 (recommending that
bar associations help in training newly-admitted law associates on ethical issues that arise in practice);
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 88, at 25-31. But see Ted Schneyer, Policy-
215
HeinOnline -- 15 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 216 1996-1997
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 15: 193, 1996
and fulfilling this obligation has become a significant motivation for bar
association attempts to encourage and enforce more professionally responsible
behavior. Some associations even have a separate committee to help improve
lawyer professionalism. 128
The promulgation and interpretation of standards of professional conduct
are among the bar associations' most successful and commendable activities,
despite the problems and controversies pertaining to these programs. The
standards themselves, most notably the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
are, generally speaking, a fair balance between competing interests and values.
Most of the credit for this goes to the ABA and its drafting commission. While
there are, of course, many ambiguities in the Model Rules and the Model
Code, this is inherent in any extensive written compendium of legal require-
ments. Moreover, the ambiguities are gradually being reduced through
interpretive opinions of courts and bar association committees. There also is
significant opposition to some Rule and Code provisions on policy grounds,
like the provisions (and supporting case law) that permit advertising by
lawyers,129 those pertaining to whistleblowing when a lawyer is aware of
wrongdoing within a client organization,130 and those requiring that lawyers
disclose misconduct by fellow lawyers. 131
Efforts to enforce the Rules and the Code have encountered problems and,
indeed, these efforts have been severely criticized. 132 The effectiveness of
enforcement is restricted because of the cost and a desire to avoid intrusive
inquiries. The process of uncovering violations is, therefore, limited largely to
making and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35
ARIZ. L. REv. 363 (1993) (arguing that resort to idiom of professionalism can have negative
consequences for fonnulation of public policy on acceptable conduct by lawyers and law ftnns).
128. See. e.g., ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 49 (summarizing purposes of Standing
Committee on Professionalism); Annual Repon: Committees ofthe Florida Bar, FLA. B.I., Iune 1996,
at 58 (reporting activities of Professionalism Standing Committee).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 to 2-103. Many lawyers oppose lawyer advertising because they assume that
it contributes signiftcantly to negative public perceptions of the legal profession. Recent studies,
however, have shown that this widely prevalent assumption is incorrect. See William F. Hornsby, Ir.
& Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyers Advenising: Public Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian
Impulse, 9 GEO. I. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 351-57 (1996) (summarizing results of ABA Commission on
Advertising study).
130. See. e.g., MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS201-{)5 (1990)(critically
evaluating MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13); Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13c
Gives the Wrong Answerto Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. I. LEGAL ETHICS 289 (1987)(same).
131. See. e.g., Michael I. Burwick, Note, You Diny Rat! Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory Reponing
of Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO. I. LEGAL ETHICS 137 (1994) (criticizing MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3).
132. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 143-50, 156-57 (1989); McKAy COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 104, at xv-xx. Professor Rhode has been one of the most severe critics of the
lawyer disciplinary enforcement process. For a summary of her criticisms, see Deborah L. Rhode,
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 694-700 (1994).
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complaints volunteered by clients and others. 133 Most of these complaints
come from clients dissatisfied with their lawyers' fees, or some other aspect of
the lawyer-client relationship. When reviewed by screening personnel (who, in
many states, are bar association committee members), most complaints are
found to be groundless. 134 This screening process, however, has been
criticized as being inefficient, overly secretive, and unduly lenient. 135
Inefficiencies, where they exist, are largely the result of staffing inadequacies,
including undue reliance on lawyer volunteers or a dearth of paid employees.
Critics who say that the complaint screening process is overly secretive
point to the fact that the names of the lawyers who have been charged and the
charges against them are commonly not made public unless further enforcement
action is pursued. It is also frequent practice not to disclose names and charges
if a private reprimand alone is given. The rationale for these secretive practices
is that publicizing complaints found to be groundless or indicating only very
minor infractions can unfairly damage the reputation, and thereby the practice,
of the lawyer charged. 136
Critics who say that the disciplinary enforcement process is too lenient
point to the comparatively small number of lawyers each year who receive
serious sanctions and the large percentage of complaints that are dismissed or
result in only a private reprimand. 137 The assumption is that these figures are
strongly indicative of leniency. Moreover, this ostensible leniency is often
attributed to favoritism allegedly inherent in an enforcement process that relies
so heavily on professional self-regulation. 138 Self regulation, it is claimed,
133. See McKAy COMM'N REPORT, supra note 104, at 99-100. In most states, however,
disciplinary counsel is authorized unilaterally to initiate investigation of lawyer misconduct. See id.
134. The McKay Commission found that some jurisdictions dismiss up to 90% of all disciplinary
complaints against lawyers because the conduct alleged does not violate disciplinary rules. See id. at xv.
More detailed data are available for illinois, where enforcing lawyer discipline is a state commission
responsibility. During 1995, of 6845 lawyer disciplinary matters acted on in the preliminary stage, 6493
(or 95 %) were closed after initial review or investigation failed to reveal provable misconduct. See
ATTORNEY REGISTER & DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT, ANNuAL REPORT
8 (1995). In only 277 of the remaining matters were formal charges fIled. See id. The state supreme
court, the only body with authority to order sanctions more severe than reprimands, sanctioned only 160
lawyers, 54 with disbarment. See id. at 11. In total, seven percent of all registered Illinois lawyers were
the subject of complaints in that year. See id. at 6.
135. See supra note 132.
136. See McKAy COMM'N REPORT, supra note 104, at 34-39. The commission recommended that
such proceedings be open and public only when the disciplinary body finds probable cause to proceed.
See id. at 33. But see Roger C. Cramton, Delivery ofLegal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 531, 613 (1994) (recommending that disciplinary proceedings be open and public from
time complaint is fIled).
137. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 132, at 156. In any given year, only about three hundred lawyers
are disbarred nationally, although several hundred more resign from the bar VOluntarily when charges
are pending against them. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE & CTR. FOR PROF'L
REsPONSIBILITY, STATIsnCAL REPORT, SANCTIONS IMPOSED IN PUBLIC DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS 1985-
1989, at 5 (1990). Each year, approximately one thousand lawyers are suspended for some period of
time. See id.; see also supra note 134.
138. See. e.g., Rhode, supra note 132, at 697.
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leads to self-serving results. These changes, however, have not been proven.
Moreover, it may be argued that a large measure of professional self-regulation
leads to more effective control due to the added authority and influence of
respected persons inside the profession.
The contributions of the major comprehensive bar associations, particularly
the ABA, in drafting and interpreting standards of lawyer professional conduct
have been very creditable. The associations' record in enforcing the standards
is less commendable, although in most states their role in enforcement, and
hence their responsibility for the process, has been greatly curtailed in recent
years.
C. Unauthorized Practice ofLaw
Lawyers have a substantial, but limited, legal monopoly over the right to
practice law, and the major comprehensive bar associations have been active
in attempting to protect and expand that monopoly. In almost every state, the
monopoly is backed by statutes or by court rules prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of law. In many states, unauthorized practice is a crime. 139
What is considered to be "the practice of law" is not always clear, but it
generally includes representing others before courts and administrative agencies
and providing legal advice or legal drafting services to others. Examples of lay
conduct judicially held to constitute illegal practice of law include legal advice
by an accountant to a client unrelated to auditing, bookkeeping or tax return
preparation; 140 preparation of legal documents by a real estate broker in
connection with the conveyance of real estate; 141 and legal advice by the
owner of a secretarial service to persons seeking uncontested divorces. 142
The principal rationale for excluding lay individuals and organizations from
practicing law is that consumers of legal services need to be protected from the
possible incompetence and dishonesty of lay legal service providers. 143 Not
only are consumers insufficiently informed to determine whether lay providers
are competent and honest, the risks are too great to allow them to make that
choice. The usual arguments given against lawyers' monopoly privileges are
that the monopoly results in clients paying higher than necessary legal fees;
139. See generally ABA COMM'N ON NONLAWYER PRAcnCE. NONLAWYER ACI1VITY IN LAw-
RELATED SITUATIONS. A REPORT Wrrn RECOMMENDATIONS 16-32 (1995) [hereinafter NONLAWYER
PRAcnCE REPORT]; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD. JR.• ET AL.. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 936-56
(2d ed. 1994); WOLFRAM. supra note 98. at 824-49.
According to Terence Halliday. the legal profession was more concerned with maintaining its
monopoly before the profession was firmly established and could take its market position for granted.
See HALUDAY. supra note 1. at 347-56. This position assumes that monopoly benefits for much of the
bar are more firmly established than currently is true.
140. See In re Bercu. 78 N.Y.S.2d 209.216-18 (App. Div. 1948).
141. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, 21 N.E.2d 771 (TIl. 1966).
142. See Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808,809-10 (Fla. 1984).
143. See QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & DAN HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 174 (1967).
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that availability of substantial numbers of lay legal service providers could
relieve the unmet legal service needs of low- and moderate-income persons;
and that where lay providers are operating, legally or illegally, their clients
appear to be satisfied with the services they are receiving. 144
The lawyers' monopoly over the right to practice law has often been under
attack as unjustified or overbroad. Among the many troublesome issues raised
by the monopoly are whether lay legal service providers would subject clients
to such greater risks of incompetence, conflict of interest, and dishonesty that
their exclusion from practicing law would be justified; whether any such risks
would be sufficiently reduced by licensing lay providers, perhaps with
demanding educational and examination prerequisites; and whether the cost to
clients for satisfactory services would be less in most instances if made
available by lay providers practicing independently. Stated differently, the basic
issues are whether or to what extent the market for legal services should be
open to lay providers. Would lay competition result in lawyers becoming more
efficient and providing as good, or better, legal services at lower prices than
without lay competition? Or would lay competition result in forcing out lawyers
entirely from some important fields of law practice?
Based on available data, answers to the above questions can adequately be
answered only by conjecture. However, it is clear that lay practice does not
pose the same threat to all kinds of law practices. The threat is lowest to the
kinds of practices engaged in by big law firms representing major business
enterprises and individuals of great wealth than it is to the practices of lawyers
representing ordinary people in such matters as real estate conveyances,
administering decedents' estates, organizing small businesses, divorce and child
custody cases, and tort claims.
Bar association efforts to protect or expand the lawyers' monopoly have
included lobbying pressure to obtain statutes or court rules supportive of the
monopoly, instigating litigation against alleged unauthorized practitioners to
force termination of asserted illegal practices, and even agreements with other
occupational associations in furtherance of the monopoly. In addition, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly prohibit lawyers from engaging in or assisting others
in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 145 Bar association efforts in
relation to the unauthorized practice of law are usually centered in unauthorized
144. See id. at 175-76; Roger Hunter & Robert Klonoff. A Dialogue on the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, 25 VILL. L. REv. 6, to-15 (1979); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by
Nonlawyers. 4 QEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 209.229-331 (1990).
145. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUer Rule 5.5; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(A), (B).
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practice committees, which are frequently assisted by paid association
counsel. 146
Beginning about twenty years ago, the ABA and many of the other major
comprehensive bar associations, took a much less active approach to the
unauthorized practice of law. 147 This decline in activity against unauthorized
practice by so many major comprehensive bar associations is somewhat
anomalous, since preserving and expanding the market share for its constitu-
ents-by reliance on legal protections when feasible-is such an important
function of most professional and trade associations. The retreat seems to have
been a reaction to rising popular opposition to monopolies generally, including
those that are legally authorized. Furthermore, attempts by bar associations to
protect the bar's monopoly can result in damaging media campaigns by the
bar's opponents. 148 In addition, there is some principled opposition within the
profession to most monopolistic privileges granted lawyers. 149 Bar associa-
tions have also encountered antitrust problems in some of their monopoly-
related practices. 150
In the past few years, there has been a revival of concern about unautho-
rized practice in some of the major comprehensive bar associations, including
the ABA. 151 Much of this renewed concern is over whether and how exten-
sively lay legal technicians should be licensed to practice law independently.
The term "legal technicians" refers to what in effect, are lay paralegals legally
authorized to practice law on their own. There is growing interest-group
support and some popular support for permitting legal technicians to practice
law independently as a means of expanding the availability of legal services at
acceptable cost. Licensing legal technicians to practice law independently is
146. Some unauthorized practice committees will, on request, give opinions on whether or not
certain conduct constitutes unauthorized practice. See. e.g., Repon of Committee on Unauthorized
Practice ofLaw, in CONNECTICUT REPORTS, supra note 53, at 62.
147. In 1977, for example, the ABA ceased publication of the Unauthorized Practice News, a
periodical that had served for many years as an important resource for bar groups trying to prevent
unauthorized practice. As recently as 1992, only 22 state bar associations had active unauthorized
practice committees. See STATE LEGISLATIVE CLEARINGHOUSE BRIEFING BOOK: UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW 96 (1992).
148. See Rhode, supra note 144, at 219.
149. See. e.g., Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice ofLaw: Do Good Fences Make
Good Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 159; Rhode, supra note 132, at
728; Rhode, supra note 144, at 222-33.
150. Law school accreditation and minimum fee schedules are two areas in which bar associations
have encountered antitrust problems. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding
bar association minimum fee schedules subject to antitrust laws); supra note 86 (discussing recent
antitrust consent decree restricting ABA's accreditation standards). On Goldfarb, see WOLFRAM, supra
note 98, at 40-42.
151. In Florida, for example, the state bar recently doubled the budget of its unauthorized practice
of law department to almost one million dollars annually. See John A. DeVault III, President's Page,
Trusts. Adoptions. Divorces-Cheaper Without a Lawyer, FLA. B.J., May 1996, at8. In Arizona, the
revival of concern about unauthorized practice is evidenced by the state bar's aggressive lobbying effort
for a criminal unauthorized practice statute. See Michael D. Kimerer, President's Message, UPL-The
Fight Goes On, ARIZ. Arr'y, Dec. 1995, at 8.
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very controversial. 152 Licensing proposals have generated considerable
support in some state legislaturesl53 and it appears that support efforts will
increase. The threat to lawyers' practices, and arguably to the quality of
available legal services, is so substantial that it seems inevitable that bar
associations will become increasingly involved in this escalating controversy.
The ABA's renewed concern over the lay practice problem manifested itself in
the ABXs appointment in 1992 of a diverse, sixteen-member Commission on
Nonlawyer Practice to "conduct research, hearings and deliberations to
determine the implications of nonlawyer practice for society, the client and the
legal profession. "154 Special attention was given to the work of paralegals and
legal technicians. The commission issued a detailed report in 1995 extensively
surveying and analyzing nonlawyer activity in law-related situations but with
a vague and indecisive.set of recommendations. ISS
Comparison of the ABA's involvement in monopoly-related problems with
that of its parallel organization in medicine, the American Medical Association
(AMA), is instructive. In many respects the two organizations are strikingly
similar. Established over one hundred years ago, they both are voluntary
national organizations with less than half of those in their profession as
members, and are similarly organized and run by their members with
considerable help from employee support staff. 156 They have many compara-
ble programs on professional education, professional conduct, and furthering
the public interest through advancing knowledge and advocating legal controls
on matters within their respective fields of expertise. 157 Both also have
152. Compare Roben L. Ostertag. Nonlawyers Should Not Practice, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 116,
with Deborah L. Rhode, Meet Needs With Nonlawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 104. See generally Carl
M. Selinger, The Retention oflimitations on the Out-of-Coun Practice by Independent Paralegals, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 879 (1996).
153. See. e.g., NONLAWYER PRACDCE REPORT, supra note 139; Quintin Johnstone, Lawyer
Obligations to Moderate-Income Persons, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 845, 847-49 (1992); Kathleen Eleanor
Justice, Note, There Goes the Monopoly: The California Proposal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law,
44 VAND. L. REv. 179 (1991). Most of the recent state bills to permit legal technicians to provide legal
serviCes have, however, died in committee. See NONLAWYER PRACDCE REPORT, supra note 139, at C-
1.
154. NONLAWYER PRACDCE REPORT, supra note 139, at xiii.
155. See id. at 73-158. Among other things, the commission recommended that the role of
traditional paralegals be expanded, that the ABA review its policies and standards to promote funher
the delivery of affordable legal services, and that states adopt an analytical approach to the regulation
of nonlawyer activity, measuring such variables as the risk of harm and the ability of consumers to
evaluate qualifications. For a summary of the commission's recommendations, see id. at 11-12.
156. Of the approximately 650,000 licensed physicians in the United States, about 38 % are AMA
members. See HOWARD WOLINSKY & TOM BRUNE, THE SERPENT ON THE STAFF: THE UNHEALTHY
POLmCS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 5-6 (1994). In addition, the AMA has about 32,000
medical student members. See id. The AMA has a suppon staff of about 1200. See id. at 8. For
comparable figures on the legal profession, see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
157. For discussions of the AMA, see generally FRANK D. CAMPION, THE AMA AND U.S.
HEALTH POLICY SINCE 1940 (1984); JAMES A. JOHNSON & WALTER J. JONES, THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND ORGANIZED MEDICINE: A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1993); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); WOLINSKY &
BRUNE, supra note 156. For an excellent (but unsigned) overall analysis of the AMA as of the early
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concerns in the professional monopoly area: protecting their occupation's share
of the professional services market and control over that market. But it is on
this monopoly issue that the approaches of the two associations diverge. The
ABA, in recent decades, has generally shown little interest in political
advocacy as a means of protecting its profession's monopoly. The AMA,
however, has been heavily involved in such advocacy. The AMA has lobbied
strenuously, mostly at the federal level, on issues which are perceived to
threaten its profession, such as Medicare, national health insurance, and
managed health care,158 often resulting in damaging criticism from within and
without the organization. 159 In its lobbying, the AMA commonly has opposed
government regulation of the medical profession and favored solo practice by
physicians, with private practitioner autonomy in doctor-patient relations. 160
The AMA has spent large sums in lobbying and operates one of the nation's
largest-spending political action committees, the American Medical Political
Action Committee (AMPAC).161 The AMA has suffered major political
losses in its lobbying efforts, but over time has adjusted to these losses,
changing its position when necessary, and often been astute in moving from an
aggressive confrontational approach to one of adapting and negotiating. 162
For the ABA, the AMA's political advocacy experience provides some
lessons. It shows that vigorous political intervention by a profession's leading
national association is inevitable if the profession's monopoly privileges are
very seriously threatened. Such intervention is not only financially expensive
to the association and its affiliates, but also can lead to troublesome dissension
within the association and decline in its public reputation. Moreover, while the
association will lose on some issues over time, these losses can be limited if the
association is willing to negotiate, adapt, and compromise rather than hold out
for all it wants when defeat seems likely. However reluctant it is now, the
1950s. see The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine.
63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954).
158. See CAMPION, supra note 157, at 253-83,305-28; WOLINSKY & BRUNE, supra note 156.
159. See JOHNSON & JONES. supra note 157, at 189-90. Controversy over the AMA's efforts to
prevent the adoption of Medicare was particularly troublesome for the organization. See CAMPION, supra
note 157, at 253-83. For the "scars of conflict" created by AMA efforts to block an earlier compulsory
health insurance program. one endorsed by President Truman, see JAMES G. BURROW, AMA: VOICE
OF AMERlCAN MEDICINE 373-74 (1963).
160. See JOHNSON & JONES. supra note 157. at 189; STARR, supra note 157. at 146.
161. See WOLINSKY & BRUNE, supra note 156, at 68-93, 226-39. In 1993 and 1994, AMPAC
made political contributions totaling almost two million dollars, more than almost any other political
action committee. See Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, Its the Institutions Stupid! Why Comprehensive
National Health Insurance Always Fails In America, 20 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL'y & L. 329, 364
(1995). In the first half of 1996, the AMA spent $8.5 million in lobbying at the federal level, on
Medicare, Medicaid, tobacco regulation, health care, and liability reform. See Lobbyists Spent More than
$400 Million in 1st Halfof '96, AP, Sept. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, US News File.
162. See ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERlCAN MEDICINE AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST 532 (1971);
WOLINSKY & BRUNE, supra note 156, at 217-18; see also id. at 44-67 (discussing AMA's profitable
adjustment following significant political loss in fight over adoption of Medicare).
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ABA may again be drawn back into political advocacy on the unauthorized
practice issue. If this happens, the AMA's experience indicates the commitment
needed and the risks involved. Self-serving political advocacy can be rewarding
to a professional association and those it represents. Such advocacy can also
be damaging.
D. Legal Services for the Poor and Persons ofModerate Means
In principle, major comprehensive bar assqciations have strongly supported
providing needed legal services to the poor at little or no cost to clients. The
associations consider access to the legal system by all, rich or poor, an
essential feature of a democratic order. 163 There have been some association
lobbying successes on legal aid and public defender funding, especially the
ABA's strong stance with Congress on behalf of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion. These efforts undoubtedly helped considerably in obtaining continued
funding for this beleaguered agency and in preventing the agency's termina-
tion. l64 Some state bar associations have also engaged in lobbying efforts to
support legal aid. l6S Pro bono representation is another program of legal
services to the poor that bar associations have helped foster. They have done
so by publicizing the need for such services, conducting recruitment of pro
bono volunteer attorneys, and providing training in poverty law for pro bono
volunteers. l66 Mandatory pro bono has been extensively debated within bar
associations but generally rejected. 167 It was, however, approved in early
163. See generally CMLJuSllCE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s (1991) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE]
(compiling papers from conference sponsored by ABA and Tulane Law School on access to legal system
by poor and persons of moderate means); FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY
(1994) (reporting results of national interview study on legal needs of low- and moderate-income
households, conducted by ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public and Temple University
Institute for Survey Research).
164. See Rhonda McMillion, LSC Down But Not Out, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 118.
165. Leaders of the Texas State Bar, for example, lobbied members of the Texas delegation to
Congress to preserve federal funding for legal services. See LSC: Fighting for Survival, 58 TEx. B.J.
500 (1995). In Tennessee, the state bar association lobbied successfully for a litigation tax to help fund
legal aid. See Harris A. Gilbert, President's Perspective, Lawyers Should Remain Leaders in the
Legislative Process, TENN. B.J., May-June 1995, at 3.
166. See STANDARDS FOR PROGRAMS PROVIDING CIVIL PRo BONO LEGAL SERVICES TO PERSONS
OF MODERATE MEANS (1996). For statistical data on pro bono programs, see ABA INVENTORY, supra
note 2, §§ 3-Xm, 4-Xm.
The Connecticut Bar Association has been particularly successful in recruiting lawyers to give some
of their time to pro bono representation. Two thousand volunteer pro bono attorneys take pan in its
"Law Works for People" program and receive free training in family law, Social Security law, and other
common legal fields of pro bono practice. See Pro Bono Committee Repon, in CONNECTICUT REPORTS,
supra note 53, at 57.
167. No state bar association has imposed a mandatory pro bono requirement on its members. See
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 139, at 1043-49; Kendra Emi Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation ofMandatory
Pro Bono, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 909 (1996). A few local bar associations, however, have done so.
See John R. DeSteigeur, Comment, Mandatory Pro Bono: The Path to Equal Justice, 16 PEPP. L. REv.
355, 365 (1989). In 1990, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York endorsed a proposal to
require that each New York lawyer donate a minimum of 40 hours every two years to pro bono
representation, with certain cash or service substitutes possible. The state's highest court rejected the
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discussion drafts of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 168 There
has been a scattering of other bar association efforts helpful in providing more
or better legal representation to the poor, such as administering Interest on
Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) programs that provide funding for legal
aid; 169 advocating better procedures for court appointment of attorneys for
indigent parties when such appointments are necessary; 170 and pro se training
programs for litigants who wish to represent themselves. 171
The major comprehensive bar associations have also given some attention
to the legal representation problems of another sizable under-represented group:
low- and moderate-income persons with incomes above what would qualify
them for legal aid. It is recognized that many in this low- to moderate-income
range fail to seek legal representation. This usually is due to those in need not
knowing that they have a legal problem, not knowing how to select a suitable
lawyer, apprehension over likely legal fees, or an inability to pay substantial
legal fees absent contingent fee possibilities. Bar associations frequently make
some attempts to increase representation opportunities for these people, most
often by operating lawyer referral programs in which inquirers seeking help in
finding a lawyer are directed to appropriate lawyers for the type of problem
involved, commonly with assurance that there will be no fee or only a low
fixed fee for the initial consultation. 172 Inquiries normally are by telephone
to a central location and referrals made only to lawyers willing to participate
in the program. 173 Obviously these programs can be of benefit not only to the
potential clients, most of whom are in the low- to moderate-income range, but
also to the lawyers receiving referrals. The ABA has adopted model rules for
proposal. See Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSfRA L. REv. 1113, 1114-15 (1991).
168. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 317 (1996). In one of its few aspirational provisions, the Model Rules provide that a lawyer
should "aspire" to render at least 50 hours of pro bono services per year. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1. In addition to Rule 6.1, the ABA has adopted several resolutions
supporting pro bono on a voluntary basis. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 263.
169. See Arthur J. England, Jr., Modem Day Alchemy: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, in
CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 163, at 561. Most states have IOLTA programs and the ABA operates a
clearinghouse to provide information and technical assistance to them. Besides Oregon, California and
North Carolina, however, the IOLTA programs are usually administered by bar foundations rather than
bar associations.
170. See, e.g., Michigan Bar Committee on Defender Systems and Services Report, 73 MICH. B.J.
792 (1994).
171. See, e.g., Pro Bono In Iowa, IOWA LAW., Oct. 1994, at 6 (discussing efforts by Iowa Bar
Association to educate domestic abuse victims and lay counselors about available legal steps). While
persons may represent themselves, a nonlawyer officer or employee is generally prohibited from
representing corporations and other organizations in court. See WOLFRAM, supra note 98, at 803-06.
172. There are at least 325 such referral programs nationwide, most of which are operated or
sponsored by state or local bar associations. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYER REFERRAL AND
INFO. SERVS., CHARACTERISTICS OF LAWYER REFERRAL PROGRAMS, 1990 SURVEY REsULTS 1-2 (1991)
[hereinafter LAWYER REFERRAL SURVEY]; see also ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2, §§ 3-Xm, 4-Xm.
173. The referral volume in some programs is tremendous. In 1995, for example, the program
operated by the Florida Bar Association made nearly 95.000 referrals. See Report ofthe Lawyer Referral
Service Committee, FLA. B.J., June 1996, at 74.
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lawyer referral services '74 and collects and publishes detailed StatiStICS on
such services. 17s Some bar associations have also tried to help low- and
moderate-income people with their legal problems through programs informing
them about common legal problems. 176 A few bar associations even provide
free clinics staffed by volunteers for low- and moderate-income persons. 177
Other than lobbying support for legal aid and helping to add more legal
services through pro bono programs they sponsor, the major comprehensive
bar associations have had little impact on expanding the availability and quality
of legal services for those in poverty. Underlying this problem are basic
questions of public policy as to who should bear the financial responsibility for
providing needed legal services to those in poverty. Should lawyers provide
these services for free or should the cost be borne by government or the
broader charitable community? If lawyers must assume the financial obligation,
can and should they pass the cost back to their other clients through higher fees
so that much of the client community ultimately pays? And if lawyers
ultimately should carry much of the cost, what should be the responsibilities,
if any, of bar associations in requiring lawyers to bear this cost? These
questions have proven troublesome to the bar associations. The associations'
approach has largely been limited to pushing for continued government funding
of legal aid organizations and urging lawyers voluntarily to provide some no-
fee legal representation to the poor. 178 American society is in a quandary as
to what kinds of aid should be available to those in poverty, on what terms,
and who should bear the cost of this aid. Needed legal services are merely a
part of this much larger dilemma.
The impact of the comprehensive bar associations on legal services to low-
and moderate-income persons above the legal aid level has likewise been
modest. But the problems of providing more and better legal services to this
group are considerably different from that of providing such services to those
in poverty, and in some respects more difficult. Most of those in the somewhat
higher income range can afford to pay typical lawyers' fees charged for most
legal services they need, although payment in many instances may entail
considerable financial sacrifice. Assuming that those in this potential client
group are aware of their legal needs and that lawyers can be of help, the
problems largely are market ones. Should one be concerned about those who
can afford to pay market fees but refuse to seek help because they consider the
fees too high? Are the market legal fees typically charged this low- to
moderate-income group by lawyers so high and so burdensome that fees should
174. MODEL SUPREME COURT RULES GoVERNING LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICES (1993).
175. See LAWYER REFERRAL SURVEY. supra note 172.
176. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
177. See NONLAWYER PRACTICE REPORT, supra note 139. at 103.
178. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
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legally be regulated? Should most legal services to this group be brought under
some kind of mandatory insurance scheme or perhaps subsidized? Is the
lawyers' monopoly part of the problem and would a desirable solution lie in
abolishing or substantially reducing lawyers' monopoly privileges so that
cheaper legal service providers can enter the market? Can law firms restructure
themselves, voluntarily or with legal inducements and coercion, so that they
can cut costs and cut fees? Finally, what role, if any, should the major
comprehensive bar associations assume in relation to these questions? These are
all questions with which the profession at large, bar associations included, must
struggle. They have a direct bearing on such difficult issues as unauthorized
practice of law, lawyer advertising, and expansion in alternative dispute
resolution systems. Clearly, lawyer referral programs, although helpful, are
insufficient answers. More attention needs to be given to ways in which
lawyers can remain competitive in the low- to moderate-income market for
legal services, especially as to matters in which contingent fees are not
appropriate.
E. Litigation
Most aspects of litigation are of concern to major comprehensive bar
associations. The judiciary is often the focus of attention, including recommen-
dations by some associations to fill judicial vacancies. The ABA's Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary regularly makes such recommendations for
vacancies on the federal bench, the Supreme Court included, and is the best
known example of bar association action of this kind,179 but many state and
larger local bar associations make recommendations to fill state or local judicial
vacancies. l80 There are also bar associations that administer regular lawyer
evaluations of sitting judges and judgeship candidates. 181 Some bar associa-
tions have taken public positions on such matters pertaining to the judiciary as
judicial salaries and retirement funding,l82 and on the rotation of judges. 183
The relevant committees of bar associations also frequently propose amend-
179. See generally ABA STANDING COMMl1TEE ON THE JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is AND How IT
WORKS (1988); William G. Ross, Panicipation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process,
43 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1990); R. Townsend Davis. Jr.• Note, The American BarAssociation and Judicial
Nominees: Advice Without Consent?, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 550 (1989); Robert A. Stein, Executive
Director's Report, For the Benefit of the Nation, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996. at 104.
180. See generally Charles H. Sheldon. The Role ofState Bar Associations in Judicial Selections,
77 JUDICATURE 300 (1994).
181. See, e.g., John B. Simon, President's Page, CBA REc. (Chicago Bar Association), June 1994,
at 10 (reporting that 47% of subcircuitjudgeship candidates were not recommended in evaluation by bar
association Judicial Evaluation Committee).
182. See, e.g., John Carson & Richard Chernick. President's Page, Reportfrom Sacramento. L.A.
LAW., Feb. 1995, at 11.
183. See, e.g., Committee on Rules ofJudicial Administration Report, FLA. B.J., June 1995, at 73.
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ments to court rulesl84 and jury charges for different kinds of cases. ISS
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is still another subject that has attracted
considerable bar association consideration and proposals for expansion and
improvement. l86 The ABA has taken a leadership position in promoting the
ADR concept. l87 In addition, the ABA has adopted a Model Code of Judicial
Conduct that sets widely followed standards of judicial behavior. 188 The ABA
also has been particularly active recently in broad evaluations of judicial
administration problems and has adopted prescriptive standards. 189 A number
of state and local bar associations have been developing better solutions to
basic problems of judicial administration as well. l90
The major comprehensive bar associations not surprisingly exert consider-
able influence on the litigation process, most notably in shaping procedural
rules and selecting judicial personnel. Much of this influence comes from
proposals by bar association sections and committees especially concerned with
one aspect or another of the litigation process. Courts and legislatures can be
expected to take seriously proposals for improving judicial operations when
these proposals come from practitioners who regularly appear before the
courts. In judicial selections, legislatures and executive branch officials with
responsibility for judicial appointments are especially prone to weigh heavily
judicial recommendations from the bar. Bar association recommendations seem
to be particularly effective in states with merit selection commissions and less
effective in states where judges are popularly elected. 191 At the federal level,
controversy over ABA judicial recommendations is an indication of the
seriousness with which these recommendations are taken by political
184. See. e.g.• Committee on Coun Rules Repon. 58 TEx. B.J. 734 (1995). The Florida Bar has
10 different court rules committees. For recent reports by these committees. see FLA. B.J., June 1996,
at 65-72.
185. In 1994, the State Bar of Texas had five separate committees preparing jury instructions for
different fields of law. For reports on these committees, see 57 TEx. B.J. 778 (1994).
186. See. e.g., Section on Alternative Dispute Resolution Repon. 58 TEx. B.J. 745 (1995).
187. See ABA BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUsnCE SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE ABA
WORKING GROUP ON CML JusnCE SYSTEM PROPOSALS 31-43 (1992) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR
IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUsnCE SYSTEM].
188. See supra note 96.
189. See 2 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISfRATION (1992) (Standards Relating to Trial Courts);
1 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMlNlSfRATION (1990) (Standards Relating to Court Organizations); see
also BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CML JUsnCE SYSTEM. supra note 187; STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss (3d ed. 1991).
190. See. e.g.• Repon o/the Judicial Administration. Selection. and Tenure Committee, FLA. B.J.,
June 1996, at 54.
191. See generally Sheldon. supra note 180.
227
HeinOnline -- 15 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 228 1996-1997
Yale Law & Policy Review
decisionmakers. l92
Vol. 15:193, 1996
F. Substantive Law Reform
Substantive law in all fields is, of course, always subject to change and
proposals for change are frequent. As major comprehensive bar associations
are concerned with this dynamic, they regularly review current propos-
als-especially pending legislation-and often seek to influence the final
adoption process by initiating their own proposals.
Much bar association law reform activity is carried out by association
committees and sections. Collectively, committees and sections cover nearly
every field of law. A variety of approaches are taken by bar associations to law
reform. For example, through committees or sections, they commonly evaluate
bills currently before the state legislature in particular fields, then publicly
declare their support or opposition to those in which the association has a
special interest. They also make in-depth studies of troublesome legal problems
and prepare drafts of recommended statutes or regulations. In some instances
they merely declare publicly their position on a matter, perhaps issuing press
releases, thereby relying on the merits of their position and their reputations
to influence the ultimate outcome. 193 Sometimes, bar associations do much
more. For example, through their own staff lobbyists or influential association
members, they may either meet privately with individual legislators or other
important government decisionmakers to urge backing for the association's
position on a proposed legal change or testify at legislative hearings in support
of the association's position.l94 Occasionally, too, bar associations file amicus
curiae briefs reflecting association preferences on matters that raise important
legal issues. l95 In rare instances they will litigate issues they consider highly
important. 196
192. Compare HENRY J. ABRAHAM ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY AND
POLmcs, 101-46 (1990), and David M. Leonard, Note, The American BarAssociation: An Appearance
of Propriety, 16 MARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 537,555-56 (1993), with Abner J. Mikva, Criticism and
Controversy atthe ABA, CONN. L. TRIB., July 8, 1996, at 25, and Stein, supra note 179. See generally
Gary A. Hengstler,In Political Year. ABA Policies are Something to Talk About, A.B.A. J.• Aug. 1996,
at 108.
193. See, e.g., ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 129-92 (enumerating policy positions taken by
ABA on hundreds of legislative and professional issues).
194. See. e.g., William B. McGuire, NJSBA Tort Reform Update: What Your Association is Doing
for You, N.J. LAW, Jan. 1995, at 4; Minutes of Special Business Meeting of the Maine State Bar
Association (June 17. 1994), in 9 MAINE B.J. 299, 302 (1994); Paul L. Stevens, Strengthening PBA's
Presence on Capitol Hill, PA. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 4.
195. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), for example, 27 bar associations
joined in an amicus brief urging the United States Supreme Coun to reconsider Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which had restricted the authority of states to regulate lawyer advertising.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
196. See. e.g., Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984) (holding in contempt nonlawyer
who prepared pleadings and gave legal advice on family law matters after being enjoined from doing
so); Greenwell v. State Bar of Nevada, 836 P.2d 70 (Nev. 1992) (enjoining typing service from
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Since the Supreme Court's decision in Keller v. State Bar in Califor-
nia,l97 one large group of state bar associations, the unified associations, are
considerably restricted in their lobbying efforts on contentious social
issues. 198 Although Keller is unclear as to just what bar association actions
are proscribed, it has had a substantial deterrent effect on unified bar
associations' lobbying efforts, as well as their filing of amicus briefs. l99
Although not bound by Keller restrictions, the ABA and other voluntary bar
associations have occasionally been faced with the controversial question of
whether they should take positions on social problems, such as abortion, that
may lead to member resignations and other organizational disruptions. 200 A
number of voluntary associations have self-imposed restrictions on involve-
ments of this kind. 201
Where not deterred by Keller, the major comprehensive bar associations
have actively supported or opposed a broad range of substantive legal
proposals. 202 This is not surprising given the diversity of interests of the
associations' sections and committees. But how successful are the associations
when they intervene? As is to be expected of organizations that regularly seek
to influence law reform, their record is mixed.203 Presumably, the record of
success is higher for those associations which go beyond merely issuing press
engaging in unauthorized practice of law and ordering state bar to formulate rules regarding supply by
nonlawyers of simple legal services).
197. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
198. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 74.
200. See. e.g., Steven Keeva, Cooper Wantsto Reverse ABA Focus, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 104
(discussing view of then-incoming ABA president that social issues should be downplayed); Leonard,
supra note 192, a1547-49 (arguing that ABA is excessively politicized and should avoid taking stances
on public policy issues); James Podgers, Which Way ABA? Pondering New Directions, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1992, at 61 (reviewing ABA positions on social issues and reactions to these positions).
201. The Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis, for example, has adopted guidelines for
intervention on social issues. They provide that before taking any positions on a matter of public policy,
the board of governors should: determine that the issue is not clearly inappropriate; have sufficient facts
concerning the issue; believe that the position to be taken would be supported by an informed
membership; believe that the issue is of general significance to lawyers; and believe that the position
taken by the association would have an effect on the outcome. See Deirdre O. Smith, President's Report,
Where We Stand, Sr. LOUIS B.J., Winter 1995, at 3.
202. See. e.g., Rhonda McMillion, ABA Targets Legislative Priorities, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at
105 (reponing ABA's support for handgun and weapon controls and opposition to federal legislation
preempting state product liability laws); Kevin N. Reynolds, CBA 1996 Legislative Proposal, CONN.
LAW., June-July 1996, at 4 (reponing Connecticut Bar Association's support for state business
corporation act that would make state more attractive for businesses); Legislative Bulletin, PA. LAW.,
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 36 (reponing Pennsylvania Bar Association's support for uniform planned
community act); Legislative Summary, NEB. Sr. B. ASS'N NEWSL., Feb. 1996, at 7 (reponing Nebraska
State Bar Association's opposition to sales tax on services).
203. Bar association efforts to influence substantive law reform appear to be successful only about
one-third of the time. In California, for example, an average of only 35 % of bills sponsored by the
California State Bar usually become law. See Kathleen O. Beitiks, Plebiscite Signed by the Governor;
Other Bar Bills Become Law, CAL. ST. B.1., Nov. 1995, at 1. In New York, on the other hand, only
seven of 24 bar-sponsored legislative proposals in a recent year became law. See Maxwell S. Pfeifer,
President's Message, Strategic Planning, N.Y. Sr. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 4.
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G. Conclusions
Whatever the effectiveness of each individual program, like many nonprofit
organizations, most comprehensive bar associations have overextended
themselves, spreading their resources too thinly over too many activities. Some
of the associations are recognizing this problem and taking steps to realign their
organization and operations. The Oregon State Bar, for example, is engaged
in a comprehensive performance review of all its programs, pursuant to which
ineffective programs will be modified or discontinued. 204 Part III discussed
some of the specific problems facing bar association programs. In Part IV the
Article moves from the specific to the more general, discussing some
limitations on the effectiveness of associations broadly speaking.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS
Like other organizations, the major comprehensive bar associations have
limitations that tend to prevent or deter effective association performance.
These limitations are important reasons for the mixed effectiveness record of
association programs and the associations' failure to advance more fully their
policy objectives. One of the associations'principallimitations is financial. For
organizations with so many programs, the major comprehensive bar associa-
tions are very restricted in the funds with which they have to work. Moreover,
their funds come largely from members' dues; hence, if membership declines,
income normally declines. There also is considerable member resistance to
raising dues and, in some associations, even pressure to lower existing
dues. lOS
Another limitation on more effective action by major comprehensive bar
associations is their reliance on member volunteers for a high percentage of
association work. Members who assume these· work assignments are volun-
teers: They are unpaid and willingly assume certain duties, such as drafting
proposed legislation or professional ethics opinions, lecturing at legal education
sessions, participating in association-sponsored pro bono representation
programs, taking part in committee or governing board deliberations, or
advising on internal management problems. In many instances, members are
appointed by the association's leadership to perform designated tasks, but
selection for top association and section leadership positions may be by
election. For some assignments, such as participation in association pro bono
204. See Karen L. Garst. Measuring Outcomes, OR. ST. B. BULL., Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 29. The
New York State Bar Association recently initiated a similar evaluation process. See Pfeiffer, supra note
203, at 3.
205. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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efforts, any member who requests the assignment ordinarily will be accepted.
Association reliance on unpaid member volunteers for so much association
work is partly due to the associations' financial limitations but is largely
attributable to the perception of many members that active involvement in
association work is a benefit, even a duty, of membership. But volunteer
workers can create problems: Volunteers are greatly restricted in the amount
of time they can give, some of them shirk their responsibilities, and supervision
is difficult. This extensive reliance on volunteers can also contribute to the
lethargy and inertia that too often characterize association performance.
Moreover, paid support staffs are small given the need, and most of the paid
staff have little authority.
There are also serious weaknesses in association leadership structures. Not
only are top association officers, governing legislative board members, and
section and committee officers all volunteers, but typically the president and
other top officers hold their positions for very short terms. The president in
almost all cases holds office for only one year and is prohibited from running
again. Short terms of the top leadership result in a lack of continuity for
priorities for many associations. On assuming office, it is common for a bar
association president to declare and publicize one or more priority objectives
for his or her one-year term of office.206 These priorities fade at the end of
the president's term to be replaced by one or more new priorities that the new
president declares.
Another member-related limitation of the major comprehensive bar
associations is the diversity of their membership in so many respects: age,
gender, income, practice specialties, political ideologies, and racial, ethnic and
class backgrounds. Membership diversity certainly has benefits, including
strengthening association claims of representing the entire profession regionally
or nationally, and on many issues diversity helps create common bonds among
disparate professional groups. However, membership diversity in some
situations can be a limitation on association effectiveness by causing internal
divisions that make it difficult or impossible to pursue a particular program of
action or that result in compromises that hamper a program's results. So, for
example, bar association support of civil rights legislation favored by politically
liberal association members has on occasion been blocked by more conservative
members.1iJ1 Interests represented by members of at least one state bar
association section are so diverse that the section has adopted a policy of
206. See. e.g., David Beck, State Bar of Texas. A New Agenda, 58 TEx. B.I. 660 (1995); Harris
A. Gilbert, President's Perspective, New President Sets Goals, TENN. B.I., Iul.-Aug. 1994, at 3;
Roberta Cooper Ramo, President's Message, Defending American Democracy, A.B.A. 1., Sept. 1995,
at 8; Roberta Cooper Ramo, President's Message, Letter From the Front, A.B.A. I., Nov. 1995, at 8.
207. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the Chicago Bar Association's Civil Rights Committee
was unable to obtain the association's backing for state and federal civil rights legislation. See
HALLIDAY, supra note I, at 237-45.
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engaging in no lobbying or other political advocacy on matters within its
sphere of concern.208 The comprehensive bar associations, being open to
widely diverse memberships, are particularly vulnerable to the inhibiting
influence of member differences on programming.209 Yet the comprehensive
bar associations all seek large memberships, and the greater income and
influence that accompany such memberships. The unified bar concept even
legally requires large and fully open memberships. What follows almost
invariably from large memberships in comprehensive bar associations is more
membership diversity and consequent added risk of stultified programmatic
action.
This risk, however, has been reduced appreciably in most comprehensive
associations by allowing association sections and committees a large measure
of autonomy. Within their primary sphere of concern, most sections and
committees can develop their own programs with few restrictions, although
taking public positions, lobbying, and other law reform advocacy efforts may
require approval of the association leadership.210 This fragmentation of
authority decreases the possibilities of the broader membership blocking or
qualifying association programs. When the rather frequent differences between
different committees or sections develop, leadership usually intervenes to
resolve the differences by favoring one side over the other, accepting the
position of neither side, or working out some kind of compromise arrange-
ment. 211 If the differences are over law reform proposals, such a compromise
agreement may consist of permitting each side to express its views before
appropriate government authorities without the larger association's endorsement
of any view.
208. This section is the Health Law Section of the Florida Bar Association. Although it does not
engage in lobbying. the section provides technical assistance to the state legislature on non-tort-related
health law matters, subject to approval by the bar association's board of governors. See Lewis W.
Fishman, HealJh Law Section Repon, FLA. B.J., June 1996, at 42.
209. In considering the implications of bar association membership diversity, Heinz and Laumann
make this general observation:
Herein lies the dilemma of every professional association. The more its membership reflects
the diversity of the larger society, the more limited and noncontroversial will be the goals that
it is able to achieve. Conversely, the more limited or elitist its recruitment. the more it is able
to take clear stands on controversial issues. but the less it is able to serve as an effective
vehicle for mobilizing both public and professional opinion behind particular courses ofaction.
JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
272 (1982); see also POWELL, supra note 1, at 115-38 (discussing deterrent impact on association
programs of diverse association membership and consequent internal dissension with reference to
Association of the Bar of the City of New York). But see id. at 137-38 (arguing that dominance of
association by elite segment of bar can reduce deterrent effect of more diverse membership as to
positions and programs favored by this elite).
210. An ABA section, for example, must follow detailed internal procedures before presenting a
statement to a governmental agency. See ABA HANDBOOK. supra note 31, at 77-80. The ABA has
similar procedures with respect to the ming of amicus curiae briefs in the name of the association. See
id. at 80-86.
211. See POWELL, supra note 1, at 115-38.
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Still another member-related limitation faced by the ABA and all but a few
state bar associations is the wide geographic distribution of their members. This
dispersion restricts the frequency of meetings and other in-person sessions, and
it further restricts the effectiveness of top leadership who often reside some
distance from association headquarters. It also results in many association
activities being crammed into the few days devoted each year to the annual
meeting. This limitation of scattered membership does not, of course, exist for
local bar associations or for state bar associations in states that are geographi-
cally small, such as Rhode Island and Connecticut.
An added significant limitation for the major comprehensive bar associa-
tions is the potential inconsistency between two of the associations' most basic
policy goals. The two policy goals are furthering members' interests and
furthering broader public interests. The associations are committed to both
goals and usually the two do not conflict, but how the associations should react
when the two are or are perceived to be in conflict can be highly contentious
and can subject the associations to extensive criticism from within and without
the profession. Examples of issues that have been embroiled in professional
interest/public interest controversies, and on which the bar associations have
been under pressure to take sides include: the right of paralegals or legal
technicians to practice law independently,212 the need to impose more severe
legal restrictions on lawyers' contingency fees,213 and the need for tort law
reform that would cut back on plaintiffs' available remedies. 214 If the
interests of bar association members, or a large percentage of them, are
seriously affected by a particular issue, the position and action the association
takes on that issue, however rationalized, will in all probability be in accord
with member self-interest. This result is true of most all professional and trade
associations. The American Medical Association, for example, is now
experiencing the result of members' self-interest in its stands on current
proposals to restructure the medical profession and its funding. 215 The result
is apparent in bar association positions on issues such as contingency fees, and
in a few provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model
Code of Professional Responsibility,216 both of which originated with the
212. See supra notes 139-155 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Lester Brickman. Contingency Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 34-35 (1989); Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real,
Making Ethics Work: A Proposalfor Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173, 179-81 (1995).
214. See, e.g., Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 60; Henry
J. Reske, A Classic Battle ofLobbyists, A.B.A. J., June 1995. at 22.
215. See WOLINSKY & BRUNE, supra note 156, at 34-43,217-25.
216. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (permitting disclosure
of confidential information relating to representation of client "to establish a claim or defense on behalf
of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSffiILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (same); MODEL RULE 6.2(b) (permitting lawyer to avoid court
appointment as counsel for client if representation would be unreasonable financial burden on lawyer);
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ABA. Even the concepts of mandatory lawyer professional conduct standards,
such as those articulated in the Rules and the Code, have a self-interest element
to them, for they help create a more favorable public perception of lawyering
as a profession with estimable and widely followed principles of lawyer
conduct.
External factors also limit bar association performance. Among these forces
are legal restrictions and obligations imposed on the associations. For instance,
court rules or statutes impose the unified state bar association format in most
states, prescribe how unified associations may be structured, and mandate that
they have open memberships.217 In addition, recent case law has added
important restrictions on how unified bar association dues may be spent. 218
The antitrust laws also limit some bar association activities, such as the setting
of minimum fee schedules or accreditation standards for law schools. 219
There also are constitutional limits on the extent to which standards of
professional conduct (the drafting and revising of which have largely been a
bar association function) may restrict advertising220 and client solicitation by
lawyers. 221 Another example is specialty certification of lawyers, a procedure
in which bar associations often are involved and that is regulated by court rule
in some states. 222
A further external limitation on all comprehensive bar associations is
competition for members, funds, and influence from specialty bar associations.
There are many specialty bar associations; a few have large memberships, but
most have relatively small memberships and generally quite limited financial
assets. Collectively, however, the specialty bar associations do have an effect
in drawing away members, money and influence from the comprehensive
associations.223 There are many lawyers who belong to both comprehensive
and specialty bar associations, but many others belong only to a specialty
association. 224 Conversely, comprehensive bar associations, and particularly
unified associations, have a similar restrictive effect on membership and dues
income of the specialty associations. Similar to specialty bar associations, but
usually not referred to as bar associations, are a number of other lawyer
MODEL RULE 1.8(d) (effectively permitting lawyer, on concluding representation of client, to contract
for literary or media rights drawing on information obtained during representation); MODEL CODE OR
5-104B (same).
217. See supra note 18.
218. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 86 & 150 and accompanying text.
220. See Zauderer v. Office ofOisciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); supra note 99.
221. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); Ohra\ik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
222. See supra note 83.
223. See Van Ouch, supra note 13, at A22.
224. One deterrent to multiple bar association membership by individual lawyers is the
unwillingness of many law fIrms to pay their lawyers' dues in more than one association. See id.
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organizations that also have some effect in drawing resources and influences
away from comprehensive bar associations. Such organizations include bar
foundations, the American Judicature Society, and the National Lawyers Guild.
An obvious limitation on all comprehensive bar associations, particularly
relevant to their law reform efforts, is that they are pressure groups, rarely
lawmakers, and as pressure groups can influence legal change but lack the
power finally to effectuate change. How successful they are in helping to bring
about or block change varies with the type of issue, what opposition they have,
the lawmaking body involved, and how convincing their arguments are to the
final decisionmakers.
The associations cannot be expected to do much about most of the
limitations that they face. Some limitations are beyond the associations'
authority to change, such as their position as mere pressure groups rather than
as final decisionmakers on most law reform matters. Also, some limitations,
like reliance on volunteer work, are now so deeply ingrained in conventional
bar association practices that change is probably impossible. Some limitations
are so dictated by circumstances that there is no feasible way of overcoming
them; one such limitation is the necessity of relying on members for a
substantial percentage of association funding. However, it is possible to ease
a few limitations, with resulting improvements in what the associations can
accomplish. For example, there are a number of ways in which the associations
could be made more efficient; these methods include strengthening top
leadership by giving more authority to paid, full-time officials employed long-
term, and integrating and streamlining association operations. Some of the
recommendations in the next Part, if followed, would have the effect of at least
easing the adverse consequences of some association limitations.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite limitations, comprehensive bar associations have a generally
positive influence on the legal profession and the administration of justice.
They help to create and maintain a strong sense of common professional
identity among lawyers-a vital contribution, given the increasing diversity of
the profession-and they offer valuable services to enhance the competence and
income of members of the bar, including lectures, discussion sessions, and
publications covering a wide range of legal topics. In addition, associations
provide many opportunities for members to make personal contacts and to
widen their exposure, which can be helpful in an occupation where career
success is so often based on one's visibility and network of acquaintances.
Although the comprehensive bar associations are large, influential
organizations that make a variety of contributions to the legal profession and
the justice system, their effectiveness is subject to serious limitations, as
previously indicated. For the most part, little can realistically be done to
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overcome these deficiencies. Bringing about significant change in mature and
relatively successful nonprofit organizations is usually a difficult process, and
proposals for meaningful change will certainly meet strong resistance if they
begin to attract support. Nevertheless, recommendations for dealing with some
of the limitations are outlined below; each of these proposals has some chance
of generating enough support over time to be adopted.
1. Strengthen top leadership. To deal with the lack of continuity in top
leadership and the limited time that volunteer officers can give to association
affairs, full-time executive directors should enjoy more authority and higher
status. Under this proposal, an executive director would resemble a chief
executive officer of a typical large business corporation and would be employed
on a permanent basis rather than a short-term basis. The full membership or
the board of governors would select the executive director, often from a pool
of prominent lawyers. The board of governors would resemble the board of
directors of a typical corporation and would be composed of unpaid members
elected by the association's full membership. There would no longer be part-
time unpaid officers. By granting more authority to full-time executives with
indefinite tenure, the associations should prove more efficient and productive,
with the full membership retaining a large measure of ultimate control. The
volunteer leadership structure that currently prevails, even in the larger
associations, may have worked in the past when associations had fewer
members and activities; such a leadership structure, however, is ill-suited to the
larger and more multi-faceted associations of today.
2. Consolidate and streamline operations. The organized bar could increase
its effectiveness if the efforts of different bar associations were better
integrated. For ideological reasons, some bar associations bitterly oppose the
objectives of others, but the policy goals and programmatic efforts of the
different groups are generally not antagonistic. For better efficiency,
comprehensive bar associations and compatible specialty bar associations
should cooperate more closely on matters of common interest. In some
instances, sections of some comprehensive associations might even merge with
the specialty bodies. In addition, the ABA should provide more service and
guidance to other comprehensive bar associations, with the expectation that
local and state organizations would assume more responsibility for implement-
ing programs. Ail too often, the ABA duplicates an existing function of the
state and local comprehensive associations. Examples include the ABA's
educational programs, much of its review of state and local laws, its
interpretive opinions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and its pro bono
programs. The ABA, with its national network of contacts and affiliations, can
best initiate closer integration. A tightly knit federated system controlled from
the top is neither feasible nor desirable, but a better coordinated, less redundant
organizational structure is both possible and necessary. The associations should
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also develop better means of exchanging information among themselves,
especially regarding organizational experiments and program innovations. Here
again, the ABA is already active, especially through its Division of Bar
Services and its Bar Activities and Services Committee,225 but more activity
is necessary.
Furthermore, all major comprehensive bar associations, including the ABA,
need to have a common core of sections and committees, whatever additional
subunits they might have. The core group of ABA sections and committees
would include among its members official delegates from state and local
sections and committees. Each core ABA section and committee would act as
an exchange center for information about problems, successes, and failures on
matters of common concern, as well as the development of national programs
and standards. In particular, state and local delegates would inform other
members about innovative approaches to such matters as CLE, review of
proposed legislation, lobbying, media contacts, and the funding of association
programs. Where appropriate, ABA core sections and committees would help
not only to develop but also to generate state and local support for ABA-
sponsored federal law reform, model state and local laws, and model standards
and creeds of professional conduct.
Since bar associations cannot be all things to all lawyers, they should try
seriously to keep their activities within appropriate limits, taking the Oregon
State Bar's performance review process as a modeI.226 Each major compre-
hensive association should periodically review its priorities and examine the
efficiency of its programs. Programs found unsatisfactory should be modified
or canceled; most sections and committees with few members should be
terminated; CLE offerings should be regularly evaluated, and those that
provide little of substance should be discontinued; inessential, loss-incurring
publications should be eliminated; and, finally, support staff should not be
wasted on low-priority programs.
3. Reconsider the unified bar concept. There has been widespread
opposition among lawyers to the unified bar concept in a number of unified bar
states. The Supreme Court's opinion in Keller v. State Bar of Califomia227
has added to the opposition by restricting association activities and income.
Where opposition is strong, and especially where it appears to be growing,
unified organizations should be formally reconsidered, preferably by a
statewide lawyer referendum, as California recently did. The final decision to
unify should be by the bar, not by the courts or the legislature. Lawyers should
not be forced into organizations that most of them oppose.
225. See supra note 61. The Bar Activities Inventory provides an example of the useful information
assembled and distributed by this division. See ABA INVENTORY, supra note 2.
226. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
227. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
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4. Improve the disciplinary process, Where major comprehensive bar
associations are expected to remain extensively involved in disciplining
lawyers,228 they should have enough funding to hire staff. Uncompensated
appointees can take over some of the complaint review and hearing work, but
a full-time, paid staff can best perform investigations and presentments, as well
as much of the supporting administrative work. Since bar disciplinary
proceedings examine the behavior of state licensees, state government should
help pay for the proceedings, In addition, bar associations could force
disciplined lawyers to pay for their own proceedings, an option not sufficiently
utilized in most states. Moreover, the McKay Commission has recommended
that disciplinary counsel may, with the consent of the respondent lawyer, refer
cases of minor infractions for nondisciplinary action, such as fee arbitration,
mediation, substance abuse treatment, or psychological counseling. 229 This
recommendation deserves wider adoption. The disciplinary procedures in each
state also should be periodically evaluated to ensure fairness and efficien-
cy,230 preferably pursuant to directives from the state's highest court.
Random spot checks of individual cases might prove helpful as well. High
dismissal rates at the screening stage, where they exist, should be regularly
monitored to guard against favoritism or undue leniency.
If lawyer security funds had sufficient financing to pay all legitimate
claims, clients would be more adequately protected from lawyer malpractice.
Absent this unlikely financing, lawyer malpractice insurance should be
mandatory, and bar associations in unified bar states should adopt and
administer the Oregon mandatory malpractice insurance plan. 231 Mandatory
insurance not only protects clients but also strengthens the competitive position
of lawyers relative to lay providers of legal services, most of whom do not
provide such client protection.
5, Increase concentration on the justice system's most serious problems.
Major comprehensive bar associations should persistently and aggressively try
to resolve the most serious problems facing the American justice system.
Among these problems are: (1) court congestion and delay, including the need
for more judges and more opportunities to use alternative dispute resolution
228. The McKay Commission recommended that courts appoint disciplinary officials and that
"elected bar officials, their appointees and employees , , . have no investigative. prosecutorial, or
adjudicative functions in the disciplinary process." McKAy COMM'N REPORT, supra note 104, at 24.
Self-regulation, the commission declared. creates an appearance of conflict of interest. See id. at xvi.
In many states. however, bar associations still have responsibilities for processing lawyer disciplinary
cases. Moreover. given the added authority that comes from professional self-regulation and the fmancial
savings possible from the use ofunpaid bar association officials. the commission's unqualified opposition
to association involvement in the process is unjustified.
229. See id. at 48-49.
230. California has such a requirement. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.11 (West Supp.
1996) (requiring annual audits of complaint closures and other matters handled by disciplinary counsel).
231. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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techniques; (2) pro bono legal representation for those in poverty; (3) cheaper
and more readily available legal services for the poor and those of moderate
income who can afford to pay reasonable lawyers' fees; and (4) the improve-
ment of incarceration facilities and alternatives to incarceration for those
convicted of crimes. The associations are concerned with all these problems,
but their efforts to deal with them have been disappointing. Arguably they have
not tried hard enough, perhaps because the issues are too political to attract
sufficient association support, or because activists within the associations are
discouraged by slow progress, or because top leadership lacks sustained focus.
Whatever the reasons, efforts by the associations are inadequate. Since each
new association president commonly supports a different action agenda during
her year in office, association efforts to solve important problems are less
effectual than might otherwise be the case. The most crucial problems facing
the justice system deserve the continued and concentrated attention of top
association leadership over a protracted period, normally much longer than a
year.
Furthermore, support for research, including staff, should be made
available, and coordinated action with other bar associations should be initiated
whenever helpful. Each association should also give clear instructions to its
commissions, task forces, or committees involved with a crucial problem area,
and such groups should be pushed to meet deadlines set for them.
The unauthorized practice of law, especially the growing movement to
license legal technicians to practice law independently (without supervising
lawyers), is another problem demanding more attention from bar associations.
This issue potentially has very important implications for the justice system in
general and the legal profession in particular. The bar associations should
carefully consider how to respond and then take action accordingly. Among the
possible responses, the associations could categorically oppose all proposals for
licensing legal technicians to practice law independently of lawyers. Alterna-
tively, the associations could support licensing of these technicians only in a
limited number of practice areas but with rigorous educational prerequisites.
Certain kinds of businesses, such as banks, insurance companies, real estate
brokers, and accounting firms, would be prohibited from using this licensing
device as a means to move more extensively into providing legal services to
others. If it is assumed that independent legal technicians, and other lay groups
as well, will increasingly be engaged in the practice of law, bar associations
could greatly expand their efforts to help lawyers meet this competition through
greater efficiency, lower fees, enhanced advertising, and other promotional
efforts. Whatever the bar associations perceive their options to be, they should
recognize the seriousness of the licensed legal technician problem and promptly
take adequate steps to address it.
If the ABA wishes to influence the resolution of these issues, it must do
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much better than its Commission on Nonlawyer Practice has done. 232 The
work of the Kutak Commission and the McKay Commission, among others,
shows that ABA commissions can come up with many constructive proposals
on difficult and contentious issues affecting the legal profession.
6. Avoid highly disruptive issues. Although some important issues deserve
more attention from the major comprehensive bar associations, others should
be avoided. The latter are the occasional highly contentious law reform issues
that can cause extreme internal disruption, especially when an association
decides either to advocate a position or to intervene by taking further action.
An association should limit or avoid involvement with an issue if that
involvement threatens to cause a substantial number of its members to resign
or become inactive, or if that involvement threatens the association's general
effectiveness. Caution is especially advisable on contentious social issues that
have little direct bearing on the legal profession and the usual work of lawyers.
It seems particularly foolish for a bar association to risk its viability over issues
regarding which it cannot realistically expect to exert much influence. For
example, there have been very disruptive consequences for the ABA when it
has taken up the issue of abortion.233
Each association should carefully determine for itself what it will do about
the contentious issue problem. One sensible procedure, followed by some
associations, is to require approval by the association's governing board before
an association position or advocacy action may be undertaken. 234 Under such
restrictions, sections, committees, or other groups within the association may
examine any issue and articulate their own position, but no further action is
allowed without board approval. This does not solve the disruptive issue
problem entirely, but it does place responsibility for association-wide action on
a governing board. Such an arrangement is desirable because governing boards
are normally very sensitive to the association's overall well-being and their
decisions are likely to find broad member support. 235
7. Improve research efforts. The major comprehensive bar associations
could benefit from closer ties to the legal academic community generally. Most
full-time law teachers have little or no contact with bar associations, and the
bar associations make little effort to draw law teachers into their programs.
This is unfortunate given the possible benefits for both associations and
academics in the encouraging of academic research on important legal
problems. In many such instances law teachers would be willing and able to
232. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
233. In 1990 and 1991, for example, more than 1500 lawyers resigned from the ABA over the
abortion issue. See Podgers, supra note 200, at 62.
234. See, for example, the guidelines of the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis, discussed
supra, note 201.
235. In taking on this responsibility, the boards of unified bar associations would, of course, be
limited by the restrictions in Keller. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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conduct necessary background research, prepare more useful reports, and draft
better legislation than if the associations relied on others for this work. Almost
all full-time law teachers do considerable research and writing for legal
publications, often producing articles that tum out to be of little consequence
and that attract little interest. An important bar association research project
would be attractive to many legal academics, if properly approached, given that
the product would be considered seriously by experts in the field and could
lead to important reform.
Additionally, the bar associations' research base would be strengthened if
the American Bar Foundation were to focus more attention on issues of high
priority to those associations, especially through empirical studies on the
profession and the administration of justice. The American Bar Foundation is
an important research center with a cadre of able scholars, but it has become
principally a research medium for social scientists' interests in law, especially
those of sociologists; a high percentage of its studies are irrelevant or highly
tangential to concerns of bar associations and lawyers generally.236 Yet the
American Bar Foundation is largely funded by bar associations and other
lawyer sources,237 and the ABA is generally well represented on the Founda-
tion's Board of Directors. 238 If the Foundation does not reorient its research
efforts, lawyers and their organizations would be justified in withdrawing or
sharply curtailing their support. Potential benefits to the legal profession from
this quality research center are so substantial that the organized bar should not
encourage its research funding to be so extensively diverted from matters of its
concern.
8. Increase law school involvement in continuing legal education. The law
schools should institutionally be drawn more heavily into furthering bar
association post-admission educational objectives. Much CLE instruction is
substantively superficial and pedagogically ineffective, and mandatory CLE
programs are worthless to many participating lawyers. If the major comprehen-
sive bar associations and other sponsors of post-admission legal education are
serious about improving continuing legal education, the most promising
approach may be to induce the law schools to participate, adapting CLE to fill
the real needs of the lawyers who could benefit. In order to improve CLE
programs, difficult questions will have to be addressed regarding course
design, teacher staffing, testing, the effect on lawyer licensing or certification,
and funding. Greater law school involvement may be the way to assure the best
answers.
Of course, not all law schools would be interested in offering CLE
236. See supra note 59.
237. See supra note 56.
238. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 74-75 (discussing Foundation's governance ties to
ABA).
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programs.239 There would be sufficient law school cooperation, however, to
test important new experimental approaches to CLE and to improve existing
programs, if those schools could be assured of adequate funding and convinced
of the bar associations' commitment to more effective continuing education.
VI. CONCLUSION
However much the need, over the next few years the major comprehensive
bar associations are unlikely to change appreciably. They are too firmly
established, and their organization and procedures are generally accepted both
within the bar itself and by courts and legislatures, to the extent these latter
bodies exert authority over the associations. But in the longer term, the
associations inevitably will encounter new or more acute problems, and these
will force the associations to consider seriously recommendations such as those
outlined above, if not even more drastic proposals.
Trends are now emerging that suggest the kind of changes to come. For
instance, there is growing dissatisfaction with the unified bar concept, which
may ultimately persuade a number of unified state bars to abandon the form
altogether. In addition, membership numbers of many major comprehensive bar
associations are stable or in decline. This is due to several factors, including
relatively high association dues, the competitive pull of specialty and smaller
county bar associations, and the feeling of many lawyers that the major
comprehensive bar associations have little to offer them. Without regular
membership growth, and the financing this brings, associations are likely to
come under increasing pressure to cut programs and services that they should
be providing.
Furthermore, there appears to be growing support for allowing lay legal
technicians to practice law on their own. 24O Because this threatens so many
members of the bar, the major comprehensive bar associations may be moved
to oppose the licensing of lay persons to practice law independently.
Occupational self-protection is, after all, a fundamental objective of most
professional and trade associations, including bar associations.
As funding of traditional legal aid agencies declines, there will be
significant consequences for the major comprehensive bar associations.
Underrepresentation of the poor has long been a problem, and it will become
much more serious as traditional legal aid funding and staffing are further
reduced or eliminated. As a result, the major comprehensive bar associations
will come under increased pressure to develop new solutions to legal
representation for those in poverty through, for example, expansion of existing
pro bono and pro se assistance programs.
239. But see supra note 77.
240. See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
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Despite some organizational weaknesses and a number of limitations on
their operational effectiveness, the major comprehensive bar associations
currently are important organizations that make many valuable contributions to
the legal profession and the justice system. They are the principal organizations
representing the interests of a powerful and diverse profession that is
increasingly subject to market forces. Yet the associations are concerned with
more than just the legal profession's interests, and they are frequently a
positive force in furthering the public interest, at least as they perceive the
public interest. How well the associations perform in the future will depend in
part on their willingness to make changes that will increase their effectiveness.
To be most effective, however, the associations must also be alert to trends
indicative of future opportunities, and they must shape their programs in
whatever ways will best take advantage of those upcoming opportunities,
consistent with their policy goals. Whatever the implications of current trends,
it is certain that in important respects the major comprehensive bar associations
will be very different kinds of organizations in fifty years. Substantial change
is certain to occur.
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